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RACIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN POLICE KILLING
CASES
JASMINE B. GONZALES ROSE∗
The United States is facing a twofold crisis: police killings of people
of color and unaccountability for these killings in the criminal justice
system. In many instances, the officers’ use of deadly force is captured on
video and often appears clearly unjustified, but grand and petit juries still
fail to indict and convict, leaving many baffled. This Article provides an
explanation for these failures: juror reliance on “racial character evidence.”
Too often, jurors consider race as evidence in criminal trials, particularly in
police killing cases where the victim was a person of color. Instead of
focusing on admissible evidence, jurors rely on race to determine the
defendant’s innocence, the victim’s propensity for violence, and the
witnesses’ credibility. This Article delineates the ways in which juror racial
bias is utilized to take on evidentiary value at trial and constructs evidence
law solutions to increase racial equality in the courtroom.
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INTRODUCTION
“I think he did it because he’s Mexican” and the alibi witness was
not credible because he’s “an illegal.”1
Too often jurors consider race as evidence of a person’s character
in criminal trials. Instead of focusing on admissible evidence, jurors
impermissibly rely on “racial character evidence”2 to determine
1.
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017). This case offers
an example of a juror’s reliance on racial character evidence against a defendant and his
alibi witness to discriminatorily convict the defendant. Although less recognized, racial
character evidence against a victim can similarly be relied upon to discriminatorily
acquit a defendant, which is the subject of this Article.
2.
This term was coined in Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical
Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2262–63 (2017) and refers to an
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whether a defendant is guilty or innocent, whether a victim is
aggressive or peaceful, or whether a witness is credible or not credible.
The term “racial character evidence” refers to the way a person’s race
is used as de facto proof of his or her character. More specifically, it
describes how race—in tandem with racial stereotypes and biases—is
relied upon or emphasized to establish the person’s character propensity
to be peaceful, violent, truthful, deceptive, or a variety of other traits.
Fact-finders then rely upon this racial character evidence to determine
how a party, witness, or victim acted during a given event, such as
during an interaction between a police officer and community member.
Character evidence to prove one’s propensity to engage in certain
behavior is generally prohibited,3 and racial character evidence is never
appropriate. Yet, the use of racial character evidence generally falls
beneath the radar of judges.
Juror reliance on racial character evidence has been difficult to
uncover since, in most jurisdictions, evidence rules barred jurors from
testifying about racial bias in deliberations or grand jury proceedings
during an inquiry into the validity of the verdict or indictment.4
instance in which admitted evidence introduced ostensibly for non-character purposes
aligns with or promotes reliance on racial stereotypes or bias (whether negative or
positive) and has the effect of character evidence by suggesting something is more
likely to have occurred based on the race of the subject. See also Montré D. Carodine,
Contemporary Issues in Critical Race Theory: The Implications of Race as Character
Evidence in Recent High–Profile Cases, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 679, 687 (2014)
(“[W]hen what we think of in a more traditional sense as evidence confirms any
negative racial stereotypes (like blacks being dishonest or criminally inclined), it
exacerbates the preexisting problem of race as character evidence.”); Chris Chambers
Goodman, The Color of Our Character: Confronting the Racial Character of Rule
404(b) Evidence, 25 L. & INEQ. 1, 3 (2007).
The term [racial character evidence] is partly accurate and partly a
misnomer. Racial character evidence is evidence in the sense that juries
often rely upon it in reaching a verdict. However, it is not technically
evidence because it is usually not formally introduced or subjected to
evidentiary scrutiny. In other words, it is not admissible legal proof.
Gonzales Rose, supra, at 2262.
3.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (“Evidence of a person’s character or
character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted
in accordance with the character or trait.”). However, limited exceptions exist for
criminal defendants to introduce opinion or reputation evidence of their or a victim’s
character. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). Or it may be introduced in rare instances when
character evidence is an essential element of a claim or defense. FED. R. EVID. 405.
4.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b). The rule states:
During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the
jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s
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Recently, in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,5 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that such no-impeachment rules must yield to the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to an impartial jury when a
juror clearly relies upon racial bias in rendering a guilty verdict.6
The Peña-Rodriguez ruling was a positive step forward in tackling
jurors’ overt reliance on racial character evidence, and many might
assume that the problem of such juror racial bias has been put to rest.
This opinion, however, does not address one of the most concerning
racial and criminal justice issues of our times: police killings of people
of color. Peña-Rodriguez invokes the Sixth Amendment’s impartiality
clause and thus directly addresses only racial bias used to convict a
criminal defendant, but not racial bias against a victim of color to
acquit a defendant.7 Accordingly, further evidence law solutions are
needed to address the problem of racial character evidence in police
deadly force and other criminal cases where racial bias against a victim
might result in a discriminatory acquittal. This is not to imply that
evidence solutions are a panacea for racialized killings by police, but it
is one overlooked avenue that should be employed along with policing
reforms and other racial and criminal justice efforts, which are beyond
the scope of this Article.
Police killing cases are often racially-charged. In the majority of
prosecutions of law enforcement officers for killing people while onduty,8 the victims are black and the police officers are white or
otherwise not black.9 Police are rarely criminally prosecuted for killing
vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.
The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s
statement on these matters.
Id.
5.
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). The author notes that the Supreme Court Reporter
used the incorrect spelling of Peña, spelling it “Pena,” in the case name. The
replacement of the letter “ñ” with the entirely different letter “n” not only changes the
party’s name and its pronunciation, but it also contributes to structural erasure of Latinx
identity and existence. Thus, the author has consciously opted to use a more accurate
spelling of Mr. Peña-Rodriguez’s name. See generally English-Language Media: What
is Wrong with the Letter Ñ?, AL DÍA (Aug. 20, 2015), [https://perma.cc/8NMK-US92].
6.
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
7.
Id. at 867–69.
8.
This distinction of “on-duty” is made because of the numerous cases of
domestic violence committed by off-duty police officers that have resulted in the deaths
of white women. The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN,
[https://perma.cc/TRB4-YB7T] [hereinafter The Counted]. See generally DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE BY POLICE OFFICERS (Donald C. Sheehan ed. 2000).
9.
Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
11,
2015),
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people, but when such cases do go to trial, the evidence against the
officer is usually exceptionally strong. Often, the victim was unarmed,
shot in the back, while hands were raised or while fleeing, and with the
incident caught on video.10 In deadly force cases, the primary question
of fact is whether the officer reasonably feared for his or her safety or
the safety of others.11 In the absence of proof, other than the officers’
own testimonies of such fear, the victims’ blackness (or brownness) too
frequently stands in as “evidence” that the officers’ fear was objectively
reasonable.12
Jurors rely upon racial stereotypes about blacks and other people
of color being violent, aggressive, and criminally-inclined, as well as
dishonest and otherwise lacking credibility to conclude that the officers’
fear of a victim of color was reasonable and that witnesses of color
should not be believed.13 Particularly pernicious is reliance on the black
“brute” or “thug” stereotype, which casts black youth as “superpredators” and black people of all ages as bigger, stronger, and more
aggressive and threatening than people of other races to serve as
“proof” that an officer’s use of deadly force was called for, despite
legitimate evidence to the contrary. Before a grand jury and at trial,
attorneys—including prosecutors who only begrudgingly pursue
criminal charges or convictions—may try to emphasize these racial
stereotypes.
In prosecutions of police for killing people of color, jurors’
consideration of racial character evidence works in favor of the
criminal defendant and thus does not directly violate the Sixth
Amendment’s impartiality clause. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury[.]”14 Thus, while the
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-fewprosecuted/?utm_term=.23bdb0c89b8c (“Among the officers charged since 2005 for
fatal shootings, more than three-quarters were white. Two-thirds of their victims were
minorities, all but two of them black.”).
10.
Id.
11.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[T]here can be no question
that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”).
12.
Mikah K. Thompson, Blackness as Character Evidence, 29 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 321, 335–40 (2015); see generally Carodine, supra note 2; Blanche Bong
Cook, Biased and Broken Bodies of Proof: White Heteropatriarchy, the Grand Jury
Process, and Performance on Unarmed Black Flesh, 85 UMKC L. REV. 567, 573
(2017).
13.
See generally Carodine, supra note 2; Goodman, supra note 2.
14.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
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Sixth Amendment serves to protect defendants against juror racial bias,
it does not protect victims against juror racial bias. Accordingly, the
Peña-Rodriguez decision, which relied on the Sixth Amendment for
establishing a racial bias exception to no-impeachment rules, will not
usually apply directly to cases of police killing people of color.
Additionally, while juror racial discrimination against victims of color
may violate constitutional equal protection guarantees,15 juror immunity
and the double jeopardy clause foreclose post-acquittal remedies. This
makes it all the more important that pre-verdict evidence law responses
are developed and employed. This Article seeks to construct such preacquittal evidence law solutions.
As police killings are more frequently video-recorded and shared
on social and broadcast media, and as public awareness about the
problem increases, two topics are at the forefront of public and
scholarly dialogue: race and evidence. However, these subjects are
usually discussed separately. This Article serves as an attempt to
connect the two and encourage a critical race evidentiary inquiry into
police killing cases. Such an inquiry asks: How do race and racism play
evidentiary roles in criminal prosecutions of law enforcement officers
who have used deadly force against people of color? And: How can
reforms of evidence law and practice increase racial equality?
Put simply, a critical race evidentiary inquiry is important because
evidence law is important. The facts submitted to a jury at trial are not
determined by any independent investigation into the truth, but rather
by how the rules and doctrines of evidence are employed to admit and
exclude evidence.16 Evidence law is used to shape the available legal
proof and, ultimately, the narrative or story that is considered by the
fact-finder to determine guilt or innocence:17 to determine whether a
state actor’s taking of a life was warranted or unjustified.
The manner that racial subordination is advanced through evidence
law has been largely overlooked. Racial subordination in the criminal
justice system goes far deeper than overt racial animus or bias. Racial
15.
See Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 75, 79–80 (2009) [hereinafter Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal] (“A jury may not
constitutionally acquit based on discrimination against the victims of the crime any
more than that jury could constitutionally convict a defendant based on discrimination.
It is one of the most basic tenets of equal protection law that state actors may not
discriminate based upon race or gender, particularly within criminal trials.”); see also
Tania Tetlow, Granting Prosecutors Constitutional Rights to Combat Discrimination,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1117, 1121 (2012) [hereinafter Tetlow, Granting Prosecutors
Rights].
16.
Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2243.
17.
Id.
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subordination permeates many aspects of our legal system in
inconspicuous ways. Most judges, lawyers, and scholars appear to
assume that since evidence law is facially race-neutral, it applies
equally to all persons irrespective of race and is immune from racially
disparate application and impact.18 However, as this Article
demonstrates through the example of the role of racial character
evidence in police deadly force cases, evidence rules—and perhaps,
even more importantly, the principles and values behind these rules—
are not applied or enforced equally along racial lines. Consequently,
white parties and institutions collectively gain an unfair evidentiary
advantage while people of color are disadvantaged by the role of racial
character evidence. To increase racial equality, we must root out all of
the ways that racial subordination is perpetuated through the law. A
critical race evidentiary inquiry and resultant evidentiary solutions
should be one of the many approaches developed to address structural
racism in the criminal justice system.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the national
crisis of unaccountability for racialized police killings. It looks at the
failures at every stage in our criminal justice system to pursue charges,
indict, convict, and sentence law enforcement officers who unjustifiably
kill people of color. Part II examines racial character evidence and
explains its role in deadly force cases. It delineates three categories of
racial character evidence: inherent reliance, stereotype emphasis, and
expert or lay opinion. Part III demonstrates how juror reliance on racial
character evidence, which results in discriminatory acquittals, violates
the equal protection rights of victims of color. It further sets forth how
the double jeopardy prohibition and juror immunity foreclose postacquittal remedies, thereby necessitating the construction and
implementation of pre-verdict evidence solutions.
Finally, Part IV sets forth these evidence law solutions, including
education of the bar and bench on critical evidentiary inquiry methods
to identify racial character evidence; proper objections to impermissible
racial character evidence; rebuttal evidence to counter racial stereotypes
and bolster victims and witnesses of color’s good character; and jury
instructions concerning racial character evidence. Although these
solutions directly apply to the trial stage of prosecutions and the vast
majority of police killing cases never make it to trial, the
implementation of these evidence solutions would shape the formal and
18.
See Carodine, supra note 2, at 681 (“Interestingly, however, in traditional
evidence law and criminal law scholarship as well as in critical race theory scholarship,
race as an evidentiary concept is largely overlooked.”).
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informal evidence potentially available in a case. This could, in turn,
influence all aspects of a prosecution, including the decision to pursue
charges and an indictment.
I.

UNACCOUNTABILITY FOR RACIALIZED POLICE KILLINGS

Police killings in the United States are pervasive and frequent, and
the victims are disproportionately people of color.19 Grand jury
indictments, prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentences for these
killings are rare. Even when the evidence demonstrates that deadly
force was not warranted, offending officers are not held accountable.
This has an impact on the actual and perceived legitimacy of our law
enforcement organizations and criminal justice system.
A. Pervasiveness and Recurrence of Racialized Police Killings
The United States is facing a dual-faceted crisis: frequent police
killings of people of color and unaccountability for these killings.20 The
number of police killings in the United States is astonishingly high
compared to other developed democratic countries, even when
accounting for differences in population size.21 Police in the United
States shoot to death more people in a span of mere days and months
than police in other countries do over years and decades.22 Victims of
police violence are disproportionately people of color. Over the twoyear period of 2015–2016, Latinos, blacks, and Native Americans were
respectively 1.15 times, 2.5 times, and 2.7 times more likely to be
killed by police than whites.23 Law enforcement officers kill over 1,000

19.
For instance, from January 1 to February 9, 2017, police killed
approximately three people every day in the United States. Mike Blake, Police Killings
Rise to an Estimated 136 in First 6 Weeks of 2017, RT (Feb. 10, 2017, 11:47 AM),
[https://perma.cc/V2PS-9BP4]. For statistics on the race of victims of police killings,
see infra note 23 and accompanying text.
20.
See generally Colin Taylor Ross, Note, Policing Pontius Pilate: Police
Violence, Local Prosecutors, and Legitimacy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 755 (2016).
21.
Jamiles Lartey, By the Numbers: US Police Kill More in Days than Other
Countries Do in Years, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015, 6:00 AM EDT),
[https://perma.cc/YZ3S-YRAW].
22.
Id.
23.
In 2015, 2.95 whites, 3.45 Latinos, 7.69 Blacks, and 5.49 Native
Americans were killed per million people within their respective racial group. The
Counted, supra note 8 (referencing the 2015 database tab). In 2016, 2.9 whites, 3.23
Latinos, 6.66 Blacks, and 10.13 Native Americans were killed per million of people of
their respective racial group. Id. (referencing the 2016 database tab).
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people24 every year in the United States. A significant number of these
victims in 2015 and 2016 were unarmed,25 and many more did not
present an immediate threat to the officers or public. Only a miniscule
fraction of these killings are prosecuted, however, and convictions are
rare. From January 2005 to mid-April 2015, there were only fifty-four
police officers criminally charged for the shooting deaths of a total of
forty-nine people.26 Thus, taking into account the estimated number of
people killed by police in the decade, it appears only 0.05% of all
police killings result in criminal charges. Each stage of the criminal
prosecution process yields too little accountability for these deaths.
B. Prosecutorial Reluctance to Pursue Charges
Historically, prosecutors have been reluctant to empanel grand
juries or otherwise initiate criminal proceedings against law
enforcement officers in deadly force cases.27 Most of the time,
prosecutors do not seek charges against police—“even if there are
strong suspicions that an officer has committed a crime.”28 More
recently, in response to increased public awareness and pressure,
prosecutors have become more inclined to allow grand juries to
determine whether police officers should be prosecuted.29 The result has
been largely the same, however; police are rarely indicted for killing
people. In fact, “the failure to indict is an anomaly for normal cases,
24.
Jon Swaine & Ciara McCarthy, Killings by US Police Logged at Twice the
Previous Rate under New Federal Program, GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016, 5:00 PM
EST), [https://perma.cc/6J4R-TEUQ] (explaining the Guardian recorded 1,146 police
homicides in 2015 and 1,025 between January 1 and December 15, 2016). Precise
numbers of police killings are difficult to ascertain with certainty since it was not until
2015, after President Barack Obama put pressure on federal authorities that the United
States’ government began to more accurately count killings by police. Id. Prior to 2015,
the FBI’s annual count of homicides by police depended entirely on local police chiefs
voluntarily submitting information. Id. This resulted in a count of less than half of all
police killings. Id.
25.
Approximately twenty percent of people killed by police in 2015 and
fifteen percent in 2016 were unarmed. The Counted, supra note 8 (select the year, click
on “list” then select “unarmed” from the drop down menu under “filter by”).
26.
Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9.
27.
Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Restoring Independence to the Grand Jury: A
Victim Advocate for Police Use of Force Cases, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 535, 538 (2017).
28.
Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9.
29.
Ross, supra note 20, at 761–62 (discussing how local prosecutors are
increasingly choosing to automatically empanel a grand jury in police killing cases to
allow the “people” to decide, rather than allowing themselves to be blamed by the
public for failure to prosecute).
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but a routine outcome for police cases.”30 For instance, federal grand
juries indict 99.99% of the time31 but in police killings cases, federal
grand juries usually fail to vote for indictment.32 Many factors
contribute to this discrepancy, such as grand jurors’ implicit trust in the
police33 and prosecutors’ lenient treatment of cases where the offender
is a law enforcement officer.
The investigation of the killing of Tamir Rice is a prime example
of how prosecutors frequently treat police deadly force cases differently
than cases where the suspects are not law enforcement officers.34 Tamir
Rice was a twelve-year-old black child from Cleveland, Ohio.35 On the
afternoon of November 22, 2014, Tamir was playing in a nearly empty
community park with a toy gun.36 A man calmly called the Cleveland
Police to report that someone was intermittently brandishing a gun
outside of the park.37 The caller noted that the gun was likely fake and
that the person was probably a juvenile, although these details were not
conveyed to the responding officers Frank Garmback and Timothy
Loehmann.38

30.
Id. at 764.
31.
In 2009–10, federal prosecutors initiated approximately 160,000 cases,
and grand juries only failed to return an indictment for 11 of those cases. MARK
MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2010 - STATISTICAL
TABLES 12 (2013), [https://perma.cc/9RF4-QTEU]; Zachary A. Goldfarb, The Single
Chart that Shows that Federal Grand Juries Indict 99.99 Percent of the Time, WASH.
POST
(Nov.
24,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/11/24/the-single-chart-thatshows-that-grand-juries-indict-99-99-percent-of-the-time/?utm_term=.28ef87e9d6dd
(citing MOTIVANS, supra at 11, 12).
32.
Ross, supra note 20, at 762–63 (citing Ben Casselman, It's Incredibly
Rare for a Grand Jury to Do What Ferguson's Just Did, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 24,
2014, 9:30 PM), [https://perma.cc/25WM-WSE9]). University of Illinois Law
Professor Andrew Leipold noted, “[i]f the prosecutor wants an indictment and doesn't
get one, something has gone terribly wrong.” Id.
33.
Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9.
34.
Ross, supra note 20, at 757; Witmer-Rich, supra note 27, at 538–39.
35.
Melissa Etehad, Cleveland Policeman Who Shot Tamir Rice is Fired, but
Not Because of the 12-Year-Old’s Death, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2017, 6:50 PM),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331163427/http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationn
ow/la-na-tamir-rice-officer-fired-20170530-story.html].
36.
Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shot Boy in 2
Seconds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/videoshows-cleveland-officer-shot-tamir-rice-2-seconds-after-pulling-up-next-to-him.html.
37.
Eric Heisig, Tamir Rice Shooting: A Breakdown of the Events that Led to
the 12-Year-Old’s Death, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 18, 2017, 2:00 PM),
[https://perma.cc/3SW4-XEDK].
38.
Id.
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Surveillance video footage shows that Officer Garmback drove the
patrol car at a high speed directly up to the gazebo in the park where
Tamir was standing alone with nothing in his hands.39 Before the patrol
car reached a full stop,40 Officer Loehmann leapt out of the passenger
side and shot Tamir in the chest from barely ten feet away.41 Less than
two seconds passed from the officers’ arrival and the fatal shot.42
Officer Loehmann initially claimed that Tamir reached for the gun in
his waistband, but surveillance video footage revealed that was not
true.43 After he was shot, the officers did not administer first aid to
Tamir44 or allow his fourteen-year-old sister to comfort him.45
Despite the fact that Officer Loehmann’s egregious actions were
caught on video46 and despite the resulting national outcry,47 state
authorities were slow to hold him criminally accountable. Nearly six
months after the killing, investigators still had not even questioned
Officers Garmback or Loehmann.48 Due to the state’s inaction, private
39.
See Sean Flynn, The Tamir Rice Story: How to Make a Police Shooting
Disappear,
GQ
(July
14,
2016),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331165228/https://www.gq.com/story/tamir-ricestory]; News 5 Cleveland, Full Video: Tamir Rice Shooting Video, YOUTUBE (Dec. 3,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dw0EMLM1XRI.
40.
Judgment Entry at 2, In re Affidavits Relating to Timothy Loehmann &
Frank Garmback (Cleveland Mun. Ct., June 11, 2015) (Adrine, J.) (“On the video, the
Zone Car containing Patrol Officers Loehmann and Garmback is still in the process of
stopping when Rice is shot.”).
41.
Flynn, supra note 39.
42.
Id.
43.
See Helen A. Anderson, Police Stories, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 19,
25 & n.33 (2016), [https://perma.cc/7X2T-RKDH] (citing Associated Press, Cleveland
Boy Tamir Rice Wasn't Reaching for Pellet Gun: Report, NBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2015,
5:20 PM), [https://perma.cc/NQ96-JMUQ]).
44.
Judgment Entry, supra note 40, at 2 (“Following the shooting, four
additional minutes pass, during which neither officer approaches Tamir as he lies
wounded on the ground.”).
45.
While Tamir lay fatally wounded, Tamir’s fourteen-year-old sister was
prevented from approaching and comforting him and was instead forced to the ground,
handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. See Cleveland Police Handcuff Tamir Rice’s
Sister After Shooting 12-Year-Old – Video, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2015, 4:36 PM EST),
[https://perma.cc/3WDN-HM9B].
46.
Tamir Rice: Police Release Video of 12–Year–Old’s Fatal Shooting Video, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:07 PM EST), [https://perma.cc/8V42-82FA].
47.
Ryllie Danylko, Protests Break Out in Cleveland over Tamir Rice
Shooting, Ferguson Grand Jury Decision, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 26, 2014),
[https://perma.cc/9VHN-FN28].
48.
Jaeah Lee, It’s Been 6 Months Since Tamir Rice Died, and the Cop Who
Killed Him Still Hasn’t Been Questioned, MOTHER JONES (May 15, 2015, 10:00 AM),
[https://perma.cc/9QCJ-D6PS].
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citizens brought forth a petition and affidavits asking a state judge to
order the arrests of Loehmann and Garmback.49 On June 11, 2015,
Judge Ronald B. Adrine responded with a judgment finding probable
cause that would support charges against Loehmann for murder,
involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, negligent homicide, and
dereliction of duty, as well as charges against Garmback for negligent
homicide and dereliction of duty.50 The court noted it was
“thunderstruck by how quickly this event turned deadly[.]”51
After Judge Adrine’s finding that probable cause existed to charge
Officers Loehmann and Garmback, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Timothy McGinty issued a statement that a grand jury would decide
whether the police officers would actually be charged.52 Prosecutor
McGinty was slow to investigate and commence grand jury
proceedings, actively sought to exonerate the officers, and ultimately
“recommended that the grand jurors not bring charges in the killing of
the boy, Tamir Rice.”53 This type of action (and inaction) by
prosecutors in homicide cases which do not involve law enforcement
would be highly unusual but is increasingly common in cases where the
suspects are police officers accused of killing people of color.
C. Grand Juries Fail to Indict
A grand jury was eventually empaneled against Officers Loehmann
and Garmback, but the grand jury took Prosecutor McGinty’s
recommendation and failed to indict.54 Similar to other high-profile
police killing cases—including those for the police killings of Michael
Brown55 and Eric Garner56—prosecutors in the case of the killing of
49.
Judgment Entry, supra note 40, at 1.
50.
Id. at 8–9.
51.
Id. at 2.
52.
Dana Ford, Judge: Probable Cause to Charge Cleveland Officers in Tamir
Rice Case, CNN (June 11, 2015, 9:53 PM ET), [https://perma.cc/M9QZ-7J8U].
53.
Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face
Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html.
54.
Id.
55.
Michael Brown was a black, eighteen-year-old, unarmed recent high
school graduate fatally shot by white police officer Darren Wilson on August 9, 2014 in
Ferguson, Missouri. Frances Robles & Julia Bosman, Autopsy Shows Michael Brown
was Struck at Least 6 Times, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/us/michael-brown-autopsy-shows-he-was-shot-atleast-6-times.html; Ferguson Protests: What We Know About Michael Brown’s Last
Minutes, BBC (Nov. 25, 2014), [https://perma.cc/ZBP3-29M8].
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Tamir Rice “conducted what appeared to be an extensive full-blown
‘trial’ before the grand jury,” instead of the regular brief and cursory
presentations focused on passing the low hurdle of probable cause.57 In
all three of these cases, the jury failed to indict.58 Normally, in
homicide cases where the suspects are not police officers, prosecutors
are eager to get an indictment and do so easily. However, police killing
cases are treated differently. The oft-repeated saying that a grand jury
would “indict a ham sandwich” if instructed to do so by a prosecutor
does not appear to apply to prosecutions of white police officers
charged with killing black Americans.59
In police killing cases, prosecutors sometimes actually intimate to
the jury that an indictment is undesirable. In the grand jury convened to
consider the killing of Tamir Rice, Prosecutor McGinty went so far as
to hire experts to testify to the grand jury that the shooting was
reasonable.60 Further, the two officers were permitted to give selfserving statements without being subjected to cross-examination, and
the police-use-of-force experts who testified that the officers’ use of
force was unreasonable “were treated with hostility and aggressive
cross-examination by the prosecutors.”61 These expert witnesses and
others have claimed that the prosecution used “theatrics” to signal to
the jurors that the officers should not be charged and acted more like

56.
On July 17, 2014, Eric Garner was arrested in Staten Island, New York
on suspicion of selling loose, single cigarettes. An NYPD officer put Mr. Garner in a
chokehold while arresting him. Garner told officers “I can’t breathe” eleven times but
the officer did not let up. He was pronounced dead one hour later. ‘I Can’t Breathe’:
Eric Garner Put in a Chokehold by NYPD Officer – Video, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014,
2:46 PM EST), [https://perma.cc/MVU3-CQFE]; Amy Davidson Sorkin, Safer Streets,
NEW
YORKER
(Dec.
15,
2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/15/safer-streets.
57.
Witmer-Rich, supra note 27, at 539.
58.
Lauren Gambino, Eric Garner: Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD
Officer over Chokehold Death, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2014, 5:43 PM EST),
[https://perma.cc/77W5-RGPV]; Jon Swaine et al., Grand Jury Decline to Charge
Darren Wilson for Killing Michael Brown, GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2014, 4:23 AM EST),
[https://perma.cc/KN23-VYMA]; William & Smith, supra note 53.
59.
See Christopher Hooton, A Grand Jury Could ‘Indict a Ham Sandwich,’
But Apparently Not a White Police Officer, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 25, 2014, 3:18 PM
GMT),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331190153/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/w
orld/americas/a-grand-jury-could-indict-a-ham-sandwich-but-apparently-not-a-whitepolice-officer-9882529.html].
60.
Williams & Smith, supra note 53.
61.
Witmer-Rich, supra note 27, at 555.
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“defense counsel” than prosecutors.62 Prosecutor McGinty even made
statements implicitly blaming young Tamir for his own death.63
Grand jury proceedings are usually cursory events which present
one-sided evidence bent on securing an indictment against the suspect.64
Conversely, likely due to local prosecutors’ reluctance to bring charges
against local law enforcement officers with whom they work closely,
grand jury proceedings in police killing cases are often more akin to a
non-adversarial mini-trial crafted to exonerate the officers.65 Since
grand jury proceedings are held in secrecy and prosecutors control the
proceedings, “[m]any observers now see the process as a way for
prosecutors to hold a secret, skewed trial for a police officer
defendant.”66
D. Juries Fail to Convict
In the atypical case where a grand jury elects to indict a police
officer for a killing, the excessive use of force must have been
particularly flagrant.67 The “overwhelming majority” of these cases
involved an unarmed victim, “[b]ut it usually took more than that,”
such as “a victim shot in the back, a video recording of the incident,
incriminating testimony from other officers or allegations of a
coverup.”68 Specifically, in about half of the cases that survive the
grand jury, the victim was shot from behind.69 In one-third of the cases,
videos show that the victims posed no threat at the time they were
killed.70 “In nearly a quarter of the cases, an officer’s colleagues turned
on him, giving statements or testifying that the officer opened fire even
though the suspect posed no danger at the time.”71 “[A]bout a fifth of
the time, prosecutors alleged that officers either planted or destroyed
62.
Flynn, supra note 39.
63.
Daniel Marans, How a Prosecutor Managed to Blame a 12-Year-Old for
Getting Killed by a Cop, HUFFPOST (Dec. 29, 2015, 11:22 PM),
[https://perma.cc/6UDV-5CQT].
64.
See Jeffrey Toobin, How Not to Use a Grand Jury, NEW YORKER (Nov.
25, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/use-grand-jury.
65.
See Ross, supra note 20, at 763–64 (discussing grand juries related to the
police killings of Michael Brown and Tamir Rice).
66.
Id. at 764 (citing Dahlia Lithwick & Sonja West, Shadow Trial, SLATE
(Nov. 26, 2014, 4:35 PM), [https://perma.cc/ULN2-4FBN]).
67.
Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
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evidence in an attempt to exonerate themselves,” indicating “that the
officers themselves recognized the shooting was unjustified.”72
According to Philip M. Stinson, a criminologist at Bowling Green State
University, “[t]o charge an officer in a fatal shooting, it takes
something so egregious, so over the top that it cannot be explained in
any rational way[.]”73 However, even in these most egregious cases,
the majority of officers are not convicted.74
Defendant police officers are usually acquitted or not retried after
their proceedings result in mistrials due to hung juries. Of the fifty-four
officers criminally charged from 2005–2015, only twenty-six have been
convicted (either after a finding of guilt or entering a guilty plea).75
Five of these convictions were for the single event of the Danziger
Bridge tragedy, where unarmed black survivors of Hurricane Katrina
sought assistance and were gunned down by police officers who then
attempted to cover up the killings.76
Some of the remaining twenty-one convictions for this decade of
police killings were for significantly lesser offenses than originally
charged. For instance, Richard Combs, the white police chief of
Eutawville, South Carolina was charged and tried for the murder of an
unarmed black man named Bernard Bailey, but ultimately pled guilty to
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Police Officers Prosecuted for Use of Deadly Force, WASH. POST (Apr.
11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings/;
Ray Sanchez, Charging the Police: By the Numbers, CNN (Sept. 23, 2016, 3:24 PM
ET), [https://perma.cc/P9EL-6DF3]. Notably, there is a general lack of comprehensive
data on police crime. Philip Stinson and fellow researchers have sought to fill this void
and, in doing so, confirm the low arrest and conviction rate of police. See, e.g., PHILIP
MATTHEW STINSON, SR. ET AL., POLICE INTEGRITY LOST: A STUDY OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ARRESTED (2016); Philip M. Stinson, Police Shootings Data:
What We Know and What We Don’t Know, CRIM. JUST. PUBLICATIONS (Apr. 20, 2017),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180406222217/https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1077&context=crim_just_pub] [hereinafter Police Shootings Data]
(showing that in 2015, alone, 991 fatal on-duty police killings, only 2% were
considered “not justified” and resulted in the arrest of the offending officer).
76.
John Burnett, Verdict in Katrina Shooting Buoys Police Reform, NPR
(Aug.
18,
2011,
12:01
AM
ET),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331195706/https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/04/20/474973779/5-former-new-orleans-police-officers-enter-guilty-pleasover-danziger-bridge-kil]; Bill Chappell, 5 Former New Orleans Police Officers Plead
Guilty Over Danziger Bridge Killings, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016, 1:17 PM ET),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331195706/https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/04/20/474973779/5-former-new-orleans-police-officers-enter-guilty-pleasover-danziger-bridge-kil].
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misconduct in office.77 In 2011, Combs chased down and shot into
Bailey’s vehicle when he tried to arrest him on a trumped-up
obstruction of justice charge, weeks after the two had argued about
Bailey’s daughter’s traffic ticket for a broken taillight.78 Combs was
prosecuted for murder and voluntary manslaughter in two separate
trials.79 The first jury voted 9–3 to convict Combs, and the second jury
voted 8–4 for conviction.80 Both resulted in mistrials since the juries
were unable to reach a unanimous verdict.81 Rather than be tried a third
time, Combs pled guilty to the minor misconduct charge.82
E. Judges Fail to Punish
Of those police officers successfully convicted of an offense, most
served little prison time, if any. Those who did serve time received
relatively short sentences. The average prison time for a police officer
convicted of killing someone is four years.83 This is less than half the
average sentence for non-police officers who are convicted of similar
crimes.84 Some convicted officers received no prison time, such as

77.
Alan Blinder, Rural Justice Focus of Ex-Police Chief’s Murder Trial,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/us/richard-combsbernard-bailey-shooting-case.html.
78.
Id.
79.
Associated Press, Ex–Police Chief who Shot Unarmed Black Man Avoids
Jail with Plea Deal, GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2015, 5:06 PM EDT),
[https://perma.cc/ANC4-JQVJ].
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
See id.
83.
Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9.
84.
For example, between 2009 and 2010, the average minimum term of
imprisonment for homicide-related offenses was over 8.5 years, and an average
aggregate sentence of nearly 12 years imprisonment. ISABEL TAUSSIG, NSW BUREAU OF
CRIME STATISTICS & RESEARCH, SENTENCING SNAPSHOT: HOMICIDE AND RELATED
OFFENCES
3
(2012),
http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/BB/bb76.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BEM2-JV8G]. Between 2005 and 2017, by contrast, police convicted
of on-duty shooting crimes were sentenced to an average total term of 48 months, or
four years of incarceration, and most often, were sentenced to 0 (zero) months of
incarceration. Police Shootings Data, supra note 75; see also Alexa P. Freeman,
Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 677, 680 (1996) (“In many instances, police officers manage to avoid
prison altogether for criminal acts that, if committed by civilians, would lead to many
years imprisonment. When police do go to prison, it is often for a fraction of the
sentence that normally results from a particular crime. This is so even when their
brutality causes permanent disability or death.”).
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Officer Combs after he pled guilty to misconduct.85 Similarly, another
white police officer from South Carolina, Justin Craven, who fatally
shot a sixty-eight-year-old black motorist, Ernest Satterwhite, received
a sentence of probation.86 The killing was captured on the police cruiser
dash cam.87 The prosecution sought manslaughter charges, but a grand
jury chose to indict for misconduct in office; Craven pled out, resulting
in no prison time.88 In the past ten years, from 2007 to 2017, only five
white police officers have served prison time for killing black people,89
despite the fact that, on average, police (who are disproportionately
white)90 kill an unarmed black man every nine days.91
F. The Impact of Unaccountability
Unaccountability for police killings of people of color has a broad
impact on our nation. It not only leaves the victims’ loved ones
devastated, it also disheartens communities of color. When trial juries
routinely acquit defendants of racialized police violence, the legal
system “sends the message that black males [and other men and women
of color] are entitled to less physical safety than whites.”92
Discriminatory acquittals not only convey “that [the] government will
provide less protection from violence based on race,” but they also
“enforce the racial . . . order.”93 Further, it causes the general public to
85.
86.

Associated Press, supra note 79.
South Carolina Officer Gets Probation in Black Driver’s Shooting, CHI.
TRIB.
(Apr.
11,
2016,
10:35
PM),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331204333/http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/n
ationworld/ct-south-carolina-police-shooting-ernest-satterwhite-20160411-story.html].
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Michael Harriot, White Men Can’t Murder: Why White Cops Are Immune
to
the
Law,
ROOT
(June
22,
2017,
1:28
PM),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331204734/https://www.theroot.com/white-mencant-murder-why-white-cops-are-immune-to-the-1796309966].
90.
Jeremy Ashkenas & Haeyoun Park, The Race Gap in America’s Police
Departments,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
8,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/03/us/the-race-gap-in-americaspolice-departments.html.
91.
Nancy C. Marcus, From Edward to Eric Garner and Beyond: The
Importance of Constitutional Limitations on Lethal Use of Force in Police Reform, 12
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 67 (2016) (noting police killed an average of one
unarmed black man every nine days in 2015).
92.
Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 SW.
U. L. REV. 171, 215 (1999).
93.
Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, supra note 15, at 79.
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lose faith in policing and the criminal justice system. Prosecutors’
failure to pursue charges, grand juries’ failure to indict, trial juries’
failure to convict, and judges’ light sentencing in police deadly force
cases have a significant impact on the American people and on the
actual and perceived legitimacy of our criminal justice legal system.94
There are undoubtedly many contributing reasons for the
unaccountability for police killings of racial minorities. As Devon
Carbado has elucidated, the causes of “Blue-on-Black” violence are
manifold:95 a convergence of social forces subjecting blacks to ongoing
police surveillance; the frequency of police surveillance exposes blacks
to increased opportunities for police violence; police culture and
training which encourage violence; translation of police violence into
“justifiable force” by the law and legal actors; qualified immunity that
prevents civil recovery; and local government indemnification which
limits financial consequences to offending officers—all of which leave
little incentive for law enforcement to exercise care toward
communities of color.96 This Article focuses on one often
underexplored aspect of this phenomena: the role of evidence law. It
scrutinizes racialized police killings under the lens of a critical
evidentiary inquiry, specifically targeting the problem of racial
character evidence, and proposes evidence law solutions.
II.

RACIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND ITS ROLE IN POLICE
KILLING CASES

When a law enforcement officer is criminally prosecuted for
killing a victim of color, the actual charges may vary. Generally,
irrespective of the charged offense(s), the primary question the jury will
consider is: Was the officer reasonably afraid for his or her life or the
lives of others when he or she used deadly force?97 Police have broad

94.
See Kami Chavis Simmons, Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring
Trust and Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors, 49 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 137, 139 (2015) (“[R]ecent public outrage reached a fever pitch when
officers were not held criminally responsible for recent high-profile deaths.”).
95.
Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of
Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479 (2016).
96.
Id. at 1479. See also Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to
Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF.
L. REV. 125 (2017) (discussing the connection between police killings of African
Americans with the legalization of racial profiling in Fourth Amendment law).
97.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985).
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authority to use deadly force,98 and, as discussed above, they are not
usually prosecuted unless the evidence against them is extraordinarily
strong.99 Generally, there is little evidence that the victim posed a
threat, aside from the defendant officer’s own self-serving testimony.
Often, video evidence or eyewitness testimony actually provides
evidence that neither the officer nor anyone else was in imminent risk
of harm.100 However, even when the evidence against the officer is
overwhelming, juries still acquit.101
Jurors (or judges in a bench trial) acquit because they believe the
officer. They believe it was reasonable for the officer to perceive the
victim of color as threatening. They find that the officer was honest and
credible on the stand. In contrast, they find that the eyewitnesses—often
people of color—were not credible. Ultimately, it comes down to
character: of the victim, the defendant, and witnesses. Often, race itself
serves as character evidence, and reliance on racial character evidence
can be outcome determinative.102
A. Racial Character Evidence in General
1. OVERVIEW OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Character evidence is based on the commonsense notion that
someone who has lived a morally righteous, honest, and peaceful life is
more likely to have acted in accordance with that character during the
event in question or on the stand.103 Likewise, someone who has led a
morally corrupt, dishonest, or violent life is more likely to have acted
consistently with those traits during the incident at issue or while
98.
Peggy Triplett, Police Use of Deadly Force: Research Efforts of the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, in A COMMUNITY
CONCERN: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 61 (Robert N. Brenner & Marjorie Kravitz
eds., 1979), [https://perma.cc/EX2L-GZKB]; Ross, supra note 20, at 758 (citing
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“The ‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.”)).
99.
Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9.
100. Id.
101. See supra Part I.D.
102. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2265 (citing Carodine, supra note 2, at
679); see also Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race
Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 527 (2009).
103. See Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on
Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1926–28 (2012) (explaining the basic logic
behind a character propensity argument).
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testifying.104 Although the character of a party, witness, or victim may
be probative, judging someone by the type of person they are or their
past, unrelated actions goes against the well-established AngloAmerican legal principle that a person should be judged on the basis of
his or her conduct on the particular occasion and not on the basis of his
or her character.105 Thus, character evidence, whether for good or bad
traits, is generally prohibited at trial.106
There are exceptions to the general character propensity ban. In
criminal trials, defendants can often introduce opinion or reputation107
evidence of their or a victim’s pertinent character trait.108 For instance,
when a defendant is charged with homicide, manslaughter, or other
offense related to killing someone, a defendant could call a character
witness to testify that the defendant is peaceful and non-violent and that
the victim was violent and aggressive. The defendant’s introduction of
character evidence comes with risks. When a defendant affirmatively
offers character evidence about themselves or a victim, the defendant
opens the door to character evidence. The prosecution can respond with
opinion or reputation character evidence about the defendant’s or
victim’s matching trait.109 Further, in homicide cases where a defendant
claims the victim was the first aggressor, the prosecution can introduce
evidence of the victim’s character for peacefulness, even if the
defendant did not introduce character evidence.110 Moreover, in both
criminal and civil trials, once a witness testifies, his or her credibility
for truthfulness can be impeached.111 Only after a witness’s credibility
has been attacked, can a party bolster his or her witness’s credibility
with good character evidence for truthfulness.112

104. Id.
105. David P. Leonard, Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 439, 450 (2001).
106. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (providing that “[e]vidence of a person’s
character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the charter or trait”).
107. FED. R. EVID. 405 (“When evidence of a person’s character or character
trait is admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the person’s reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion.”).
108. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A) & (B).
109. Id.
110. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(C).
111. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
112. Id.
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2. OVERVIEW OF RACIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Racial character evidence is where a person’s—whether it be a
party, witness, or victim—race is considered by a fact-finder as proof
of the person’s character: the type of person they are and their
propensity to act in certain ways.113 Implicit racial preferences and
stereotypes about characteristics of racial groups are used to determine
whether the defendant, witness, or victim is (or was) peaceful or
violent, honest or dishonest, or a variety of other characteristics.114
Racial character evidence is rooted in racial stereotypes.115
There are many prevalent (but unfounded) racial stereotypes in the
United States. For instance, common stereotypes about blacks are that
they are criminally-inclined, violent, aggressive, physically powerful,
dishonest, shiftless, and drug users.116 Stereotypes about Latinos are
that they are “illegal” immigrants—which indicates both a law-breaking
nature and foreignness—untrustworthy, gang members, drug
traffickers, and the men sexist and oppressive towards women.117
113. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2262 (“In today’s criminal justice system,
blackness and brownness are frequently de facto ‘evidence’ of bad character, while
whiteness is de facto ‘evidence’ of good character. In this Article, I refer to this
phenomena as ‘racial character evidence.’”); see also Montré D. Carodine, Race Is
Evidence: (Mis)Characterizing Blackness in the American Civil Rights Story, in CIVIL
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 64–67 (Austin Sarat ed. 2014).
114. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2264.
115. Id.
116. See Lei Guo & Summer Harlow, User-Generated Racism: An Analysis of
Stereotypes of African Americans, Latinos, and Asians in YouTube Videos, 25 HOW. J.
COMM. 281, 286 (2014) (citing JOHN DOWNING & CHARLES HUSBAND, REPRESENTING
‘RACE’: RACISMS, ETHNICITY AND THE MEDIA 27 (2005); Linus Abraham & Osei
Appiah, Framing News Stories: The Role of Visual Imagery in Priming Racial
Stereotypes, 17 HOW. J. COMM. 183 (2006)) (“[R]acial stereotypes tend[] to link Blacks
with dangerous, criminal behavior, portraying them as poor, uneducated and violent.”);
see also Jennifer S. Hunt, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision Making, 11
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 269, 280 (2015) (citing William J. Bowers et al., Death
Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and
Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 265–66 (2001)) (“Post-trial
interviews of capital jurors show that White jurors, especially men, are more likely to
have negative views of defendants, seeing them as vicious and dangerous individuals
who made their victims suffer.”); D. Aaron Lacy, The Most Endangered Title VII
Plaintiff?: Exponential Discrimination Against Black Males, 86 NEB. L. REV. 552, 564
(2008) (“[T]he stereotypes related to Blackness are athletic, incompetent, guilty,
unworthy, occupational instability, primitive morality, threatening, and dangerous.”).
117. See Guo & Harlow, supra note 116 (citations omitted) (“Latinos,
especially Latino immigrants, often are portrayed in the news as criminals, invaders, a
threat to national security, culturally different, and job thieves.”); see also Andrew W.
Bribriesco, Note, Latino/a Plaintiffs and the Intersection of Stereotypes, Unconscious
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“Native Americans are frequently stereotyped as alcoholic,
untrustworthy, violent, and prone to crime.”118 American Indians
historically and contemporarily are also stereotyped as “wild” and
“savage,” in a variety of contexts including case law.119 Middle Eastern
and Arab Americans are stereotyped as terrorists and tyrannical toward
women.120 Stereotypes about Asian-Americans oscillate between myths
of “yellow peril” and “model minority,” and include that they are
overly-reserved, unfeeling, disloyal, shifty, tricky, hard-working,
academically-inclined, and foreign.121 While it is generally assumed that
racial stereotypes only apply to racial minorities, whites are also subject
to racial stereotyping, although usually to their benefit.122 Whites are
generally considered honest, truthful, law-abiding, reasonable, and—
most notably—normal.123
These racial stereotypes are carried into the courtroom where
jurors (and judges in bench trials) are tasked with assessing the
credibility of witnesses and discerning the facts of the case. A witness’s
race might be considered in determining whether he or she was honest
or dishonest when testifying on the stand.124 The race of a victim or
Bias, Race-Neutral Polices, and Personal Injury, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373,
400–01 (2010) (citations omitted) (“Jurors possess the stereotype that Latinos are
untrustworthy and dishonest . . . . less intelligent . . . [and] . . . foreigners.”).
118. Aliya Saperstein et al., The Criminal Justice System and the Racialization
of Perceptions, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 107 (2014); see also
Walter C. Fleming, Myths and Stereotypes About Native Americans, 88 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 213, 213 (2006).
119. See generally Ann E. Tweedy, “Hostile Indian Tribes . . . Outlaws,
Wolves, . . . Bears . . . Grizzlies and Things like That?” How the Second Amendment
and Supreme Court Precedent Target Tribal Self-Defense, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 687
(2011).
120. Rachel Saloom, You Dropped a Bomb on Me, Denmark—A Legal
Examination of the Cartoon Controversy and Response as it Relates to the Prophet
Muhammad and Islamic Law, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1, 22–25 (2006).
121. See generally Colin Ho & Jay W. Jackson, Attitudes Toward Asian
Americans: Theory and Measurement, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1553 (2001).
122. See, e.g., Bribriesco, supra note 117, at 400–01 (pointing out that many
of the stereotypes exist relative to other social groups, “primarily Whites”); Wesley G.
Jennings et al., A Critical Examination of the “White Victim Effect” and Death Penalty
Decision-Making from a Propensity Score Matching Approach: The North Carolina
Experience, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 384, 385 (2014) (citation omitted) (explaining the “White
victim effect” as rooted in the erroneous assumption that “crime and violence among
Blacks [is] ‘normative’ and Whites [is] atypical”).
123. See Lacy, supra note 116, at 564 (“There are many classical stereotypes
related to Whiteness. Some adjectives include innocence, worthiness, competence,
collegial, articulate, intelligent, and non-threatening.”).
124. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the
Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 (1996).
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defendant may be relied upon to determine whether they were violent
or peaceful, or more specifically, whether during the event in question
they were the first aggressor or reluctant to resort to violence and only
acted in self-defense.125 An example that will be discussed in detail is
how “[r]acial stereotypes about Black men as dangerous, violent
criminals may encourage jurors to see the victim’s actions as
threatening and the defendant’s actions as reasonable.”126
3. PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO: A RACIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE
CASE STUDY
The Peña-Rodriguez case127 provides a clear example of a juror’s
explicit use of racial character evidence. In May 2007, a Latino man
entered a women’s restroom at a Colorado horse-racing track.128 The
man asked two teenage sisters whether they would like to drink or
“party.”129 The girls declined, and when they tried to leave, the man
turned off the light and grabbed the girls’ shoulders, moving his hands
towards one girl’s breast and the other girl’s buttocks.130 The girls
quickly exited the restroom and told their father who worked at the
racetrack.131 The girls described the man and said they thought he was
also employed at the racetrack.132 Their father thought the man
described was Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez and reported the incident
to the racetrack’s security personnel, who in turn contacted the
police.133 Later that night, the police seized Peña-Rodriguez, and the
girls identified him in a show-up as the assailant.134
Peña-Rodriguez was charged with felony attempted sexual assault
on a child, as well as the misdemeanor offenses of unlawful sexual
contact and sexual harassment.135 At trial, Peña-Rodriguez’s defense

125. See generally Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996).
126. Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 843, 859 (2015); see also Thompson, supra note 12, at 322–23.
127. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
128. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855
(2017) (No. 15-606).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 4–5.
131. Id. at 5.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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was misidentification.136 The prosecution’s evidence consisted primarily
of the pretrial and in-court identification.137 The defendant did not
testify but called an alibi witness, who was also Latino.138 The jury
found him guilty on the misdemeanor charges but were unable to come
to a conclusion on the attempted sexual assault charge, and as a result,
the court declared a mistrial as to this felony charge.139 He was
sentenced to two years’ probation and had to register as a sex
offender.140
After the verdict, two jurors approached defense counsel and
reported that fellow Juror H.C. had made multiple racially-biased
statements.141 After securing permission from the trial court, defense
counsel obtained affidavits from the two jurors about Juror H.C.’s
statements.142 One of Juror H.C.’s statements included: “I think [PeñaRodriguez] did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take
whatever they want.”143 Juror H.C made other statements concerning
Mexican men being “physically controlling of women because of their
sense of entitlement” and that they “can take whatever they want” with
women.144 He also said he “believed that the defendant was guilty
because in [his] experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican
men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever
they wanted with women.”145 He specified that “nine times out of ten
Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young
girls.”146 Finally, concerning the defendant’s alibi witness, Juror H.C.
stated he “did not find the petitioner’s alibi witness credible because,
among other things, he was ‘an illegal.’”147
Juror H.C.’s statement, “I think he did it because he’s Mexican” is
an incredibly clear and blatant example of racial character evidence.148
The inference is that the defendant is guilty because of his racialized

136. Id. at 5–6.
137. Id. at 6.
138. Brief for Respondent at 8, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855
(2017) (No. 15-606).
139. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 128, at 7.
140. Id. at 9.
141. Id. at 7–8.
142. Id. at 8.
143. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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background. The juror’s other statements explain the racial character
propensity chain of inferences: (1) the defendant is Mexican; (2)
Mexican men have a propensity to take whatever they want, are
physically controlling of women, have a sense of entitlement that they
can do whatever they want with females, have a bravado, and are
frequently guilty of being aggressive towards females; (3) on the night
in question defendant was Mexican and thus, acted in accordance with
the character of a Mexican; (4) hence, it is likely he entered the
bathroom, touched the teenage girls in a sexual manner, and attempted
to sexually assault them; (5) therefore, he is guilty of the offenses
charged.
The racial character propensity reasoning here is that Mexican men
are sexual offenders, and since the defendant is Mexican then he must
be guilty of the charged sexual offenses, is based on racial bias.
Although the juror couched his assumptions about the character of
Mexican men in terms of his personal observations and professional
work experience as a police officer, decades earlier,149 these
assumptions are based on widely-held racist stereotypes.150 Juror H.C.’s
statement likely resonated with other jurors because of the prevalence
of such stereotypes. An example of the pervasiveness and tolerance of
this stereotype is that Donald Trump commenced his successful
presidential campaign claiming that Mexican immigrants were rapists
and a threat to the United States.151 As jurors discussed the evidence in
the case, Juror H.C. put forth racial character evidence and tried to
persuade other jurors that Peña-Rodriguez was guilty of the charged
sexual offenses because he is Latino.152 The juror also acted as an
“expert” opinion witness of sorts in the deliberation room, relying upon
his expertise as a former police officer to convince his fellow jurors
that they should return a verdict of guilt.153
149. Brief for Respondent, supra note 138, at 13.
150. See Celia Jaes Falicov, Changing Constructions of Machismo for Latino
Men in Therapy: “The Devil Never Sleeps”, 49 FAM. PROCESS 309 (2010).
151. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting
Mexican
Immigrants
and
Crime,
WASH.
POST
(July
8,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumpsfalse-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/?utm_term=.a66d8b1faf16.
152. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017). The use of
racial character evidence to determine guilt for sexual assault is particularly troubling
because it is reminiscent of when being black was de facto evidence of rape. See
Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at Part II.A.; Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist,
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1345 (2010); Carodine, supra note 2, at 680–81.
153. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870 (“Not only did juror H.C. deploy a
dangerous racial stereotype to conclude petitioner was guilty and his alibi witness
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Not only did Juror H.C. find that the defendant’s Latino
background confirmed that he was guilty, the juror found the
defendant’s alibi witness was not credible because he was also
Latino.154 Specifically, the juror “did not find petitioner’s alibi witness
credible because, among other things, he was ‘an illegal.’”155 “Illegal”
is a racialized label attached to Latinos in the United States.156 The
undisputed evidence in the record was that the alibi witness was a
lawful permanent resident of the United States, and thus legally
present.157 However, the juror still concluded that the alibi witness was
“an illegal.”158 This is not merely a mistaken notion of an individual’s
immigration status; it is a prevalent racist stereotype and a tolerated
racial slur against Latinos. Despite the reality that the majority of
Latinos—including people of Mexican descent—in the United States are
citizens or otherwise lawfully present,159 racist assumptions that Latinos
are foreign and “illegals” prevail. Latinos, especially those of Mexican
descent, are branded “illegal” and assumed to be criminally inclined
and dishonest.160 Here, Juror H.C. observed the alibi witness’s
appearance, assumed he was an “illegal” because he appeared and
sounded Latino, and concluded he was accordingly dishonest.
Ultimately, it is evident that Juror H.C. based his vote to convict the
should not be believed, but he also encouraged other jurors to join him in convicting on
that basis.”).
154. Id. at 862.
155. Id.
156. See Guo & Harlow, supra note 116 (explaining how Latinos are often
portrayed as criminals and invaders).
157. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862 (“In fact, the witness testified during
trial that he was a legal resident of the United States.”).
158. Id.
159. In fact, the majority of Latinos in the country are born in the United
States. Jens Manuel Krogstad, 10 Facts for National Hispanic Heritage Month, PEW
RES. CTR. (Sept. 15, 2016), [https://perma.cc/BS5Y-UQDG] (explaining the
percentage of U.S. Latinos who are foreign-born decreased from forty percent to thirtyfive percent between 2007 and 2014).
160. David G. Embrick, Two Nations, Revisited: The Lynching of Black and
Brown Bodies, Police Brutality, and Racial Control in ‘Post-Racial’ Amerikkka, 41
CRITICAL SOC. 835, 840 (2015) (“And violence toward Latino/as by the police are
routinely dismissed as Latino/as are often seen as ‘illegal’ in the US and therefore
criminal, and deserving of whatever punishment they receive . . . .”); Derek Hawkins,
The Long Struggle Over What to Call ‘Undocumented Immigrants’ or, as Trump Said in
His
Order,
‘Illegal
Aliens’,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
9,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/09/when-trump-saysillegals-immigrant-advocates-recoil-he-would-have-been-all-right-in1970/?utm_term=.c667aafaeea6; see also supra note 117 and accompanying
discussion.
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defendant, persuading other jurors to follow suit, on the basis of racial
character evidence.
B. Racial Character Evidence in Police Killing Cases
Racial character evidence is not only used against a defendant or
witness in a criminal trial. Racial character evidence can also apply to a
victim, including a deceased victim. This is typical in deadly force or
self-defense scenarios where the deceased victim was a person of
color.161 It is also important to note that racial character evidence is not
always negative. It can be used in favor of a racialized group.162 Jurors
serving on grand and petit juries in police deadly force cases can be
particularly susceptible to the use of racial character evidence because
the majority of police killings are committed by white (or non-black)
police officers with an overrepresentation of victims being people of
color.163
Even when the officer is a person of color, the victim’s blackness
can still be used against him or her. Studies have shown that non-whites
also hold implicit racial bias against blacks and are more likely to
perceive a black person as dangerous and armed.164 Further, in rooting
out racial subordination the focus should be more on the outcome than
the race of the perpetrator. “The contemporary system of race and
racism does not require intentional race-based discrimination or
animus, but instead centers on whites collectively receiving privileges
and benefits from the systemic subordination of non-whites.”165 The
killing of black persons subordinates the black victims, their families,
their communities, and blacks as a population who experience a

161. See Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2265–68.
162. Id. at 2260–61.
163. See supra note 23; see also Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9.
164. See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias,
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 357 (2007) (stating that
“‘shooter bias’ refers to participants’ propensity to shoot Black perpetrators more
quickly and more frequently than White perpetrators and to decide not to shoot White
bystanders more quickly and frequently than Black bystanders. Studies have also shown
that participants more quickly identify handguns as weapons after seeing a Black face .
. . .”). See also Saul L. Miller et al., The Basis of Shooter Biases: Beyond Cultural
Stereotypes, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1358 (2012) (citing that black
men are stereotyped as dangerous and finding in a study that black men are often
erroneously assumed to be armed).
165. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2251–52 (citing Frances Lee Ansley,
Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 993, 1023–24 (1989)).
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diminished sense of safety and freedom.166 Commentators have made
analogies between recent police killings of unarmed blacks and lynching
in the Jim Crow era167 because both are demonstrations of white control
over blacks.168 Police killings and the resultant fear of future killings
yield white dominance, irrespective of whether the officer is white or a
person of color. The race of the police officer who kills a black person
does not negate the presence of structural racism.169
1. CASE STUDY: PROSECUTION OF JERONIMO YANEZ FOR
KILLING PHILANDO CASTILE
The recent trial and acquittal of Latino police officer Jeronimo
Yanez for the killing of Philando Castile, a thirty-two-year-old black
man,170 provides an illustration of juror reliance on racial character
evidence in police killing cases. On the evening of July 6, 2016, in a
suburb of Saint Paul, Minnesota,171 Yanez saw Castile drive past and
noticed he matched the description of a robbery suspect due to his
“wide-set nose.”172 Castile’s girlfriend Diamond Reynolds was in the
passenger seat along with her four-year-old daughter in the backseat.173
After Yanez and another officer, Joseph Kauser, pulled Castile’s
vehicle over, Yanez approached Castile’s driver-side window, told him
that he had a broken taillight, and asked for his driver’s license and
proof of insurance.174 Kauser stood on the passenger side of the
166. Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, supra note 15, at 95.
167. Isabel Wilkerson, Mike Brown's Shooting and Jim Crow Lynchings Have
Too Much in Common. It's Time for America to Own Up, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2014,
6:45 AM EDT), [https://perma.cc/X8S5-FSMX]; see also Tetlow, Discriminatory
Acquittal, supra note 15, at 82–84.
168. Embrick, supra note 160, at 838–39 (referencing control over black and
brown bodies in his article that compares Jim Crow to recent police killings).
169. This does not mean that racial character evidence could not be used
against a police officer of color.
170. Crimesider Staff, Philando Castile Case Verdict: Jeronimo Yanez Not
Guilty,
CBS
NEWS
(June
16,
2017,
4:01
PM),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180401234648/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/philan
do-castile-case-verdict-jeronimo-yanez/].
171. Id.
172. Tim Nelson, Philando Castile Traffic Stop Shooting Footage Released,
NPR
(June
21,
2017,
5:00
AM
ET),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180401235224/https://www.npr.org/2017/06/21/53376
4381/philando-castile-traffic-stop-shooting-footage-released].
173. Jay Croft, Philando Castile Shooting: Dashcam Video Shows Rapid Event,
CNN (June 21, 2017, 10:14 AM ET), [https://perma.cc/E6AB-DR7T].
174. Id.; Nelson, supra note 172.
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vehicle.175 As Castile had a license to carry firearms, he calmly told
Yanez, “Sir, I have to tell you I do have a . . . firearm on me.”176
Yanez replied, “Ok . . . [d]on’t reach for it then.”177 Castile calmly
affirmed he was not pulling it out.178 Yanez then suddenly fired seven
bullets, five of which struck Castile.179 Castile’s last audible words
were: “I wasn’t reaching . . . .”180 Yanez fatally shot Castile within
forty seconds of approaching his vehicle.181 The shooting was captured
on the police cruiser’s dash-cam, and Reynolds live-streamed the
immediate aftermath of the shooting on Facebook where she repeatedly
confirmed that Castile had just been reaching for his wallet to locate his
license or identification as instructed.182
Yanez was charged with second-degree manslaughter of Castile
and two counts of dangerous discharge of a firearm without regard to
the safety of Reynolds and her child.183 At trial, the primary issue in
regards to the manslaughter charge was whether Officer Yanez was
truly afraid for his life.184 The only admissible evidence put forth to
prove Yanez was reasonably afraid for his life was his own testimony
and an expert witness who testified that, from Yanez’s account, it was
likely he had seen a gun since Yanez reported seeing Castile’s hand
form into a C-shape.185 Yanez’s testimony was contradicted by Castile’s

175. Croft, supra note 173.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.; Timeline of Key Events in Philando Castile Shooting, CBS MINN.
(June 14, 2017, 12:22 PM), [https://perma.cc/F5E4-TEGL].
183. Mark Berman, Minn. Officer Acquitted in Shooting of Philando Castile
During Traffic Stop, Dismissed from Police Force, WASH. POST (June 17, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/16/minn-officeracquitted-of-manslaughter-for-shooting-philando-castile-during-trafficstop/?utm_term=.2a8f334f5065.
184. See Martin Kaste, Cop Shooting Death Cases Raise Question: When is
Fear
Reasonable?,
NPR
(June
30,
2017,
10:37
AM
ET),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180402003642/https://www.npr.org/2017/06/30/53499
2121/cop-shooting-death-cases-raise-question-when-is-fear-reasonable].
185. KARE Staff, Yanez Trial: How Things Unfolded, KARE 11 (June 13,
2017, 11:29 AM CDT), [https://perma.cc/7CVS-HVC5].
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final words, Reynolds’s eyewitness testimony, and the dash-cam
video.186
It is likely Yanez lied on the stand that Castile had reached for his
firearm. At trial, Yanez testified that he actually saw Castile’s gun.187
Immediately after the shooting, however, Yanez admitted that he had
not seen the firearm.188 As captured by the dash-cam video, within
minutes of the shooting, Yanez was questioned by a responding officer
and made statements clearly indicating that he had not seen the gun.
Specifically, Yanez said “I don’t know where the gun was, he didn’t
tell me where the fucking gun was, and then it was just getting hinky,
he gave, he was just staring ahead, and then I was getting fucking
nervous[.]”189 Similarly, the following day, when interviewed by the
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), Yanez never
definitively stated that he saw a firearm.190 He did nothing more than to
suggest the perceived presence of a firearm;191 yet when questioned in
court nearly a year later, Yanez testified that he saw a firearm in
Castile’s hand and thus was forced to shoot him.192
Not only was Yanez’s testimony unreliable due to direct
contradictions, but his testimony that Castile was pulling out a gun was
contradicted by numerous pieces of additional evidence, including
Castile’s own last words.193 The dash-cam video reveals that
immediately before, during, and after the incident, Castile and
Reynolds are describing the situation, particularly stating that Castile
was not reaching for his firearm. Castile’s last audible words were “I
wasn’t reaching . . . .”194 Further, Castile’s calm voice before the

186. See Susan Du, Interviews Contradict Jeronimo Yanez Trial Testimony He
Saw Philando Castile’s Gun, CITY PAGES (June 20, 2017), [https://perma.cc/J8UND5SK]; see also Croft, supra note 173.
187. KARE Staff, supra note 185.
188. Mark Berman, What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Said
About
the
Shooting,
WASH.
POST
(June
21,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/21/what-the-policeofficer-who-shot-philando-castile-said-about-the-shooting/?utm_term=.16455c5e48a0.
189. Du, supra note 186.
190. Id.; see also Interview with Jeronimo Yanez, Officer, Minn. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (July 7, 2016), [https://perma.cc/S7W5LQNT].
191. Interview with Jeronimo Yanez, supra note 190.
192. When Yanez told Castile not to reach for his weapon, Yanez testified that
he “was able to see [Castile’s] right hand, it was in a C–shape. And he continued to
pull out the firearm.” KARE Staff, supra note 185.
193. See supra note 186.
194. Croft, supra note 173.
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shooting indicates that he was not reaching for a firearm.195 Reynolds’s
eyewitness testimony was that he was not reaching for the gun but
trying to unbuckle his seatbelt to retrieve his license as requested.196
Castile’s firearm was still in his pocket when paramedics moved his
body into the ambulance.197 Officer Kauser, who accompanied Yanez
and was Yanez’s long-time friend, did not see Castile’s weapon and
was surprised198 when Yanez began shooting.199 This testimony is
consistent with Kauser’s physical reaction on the dash-cam video where
Kauser did not appear to see a gun or react in any way that he
perceived a dangerous situation and then was startled when Yanez
began shooting.200 Additionally, the prosecution’s expert witness
testified that there was “absolutely no reason to believe Mr. Castile was
some kind of threat,”201 and that Yanez’s actions were “objectively
unreasonable” that day.202
Ultimately, the determination of whether Defendant Yanez was
reasonably afraid for his safety came down to character. The jury had
to determine who they believed. Did they believe Defendant Yanez
when he claimed Castile attempted to pull a gun on him? Or did they
believe Castile, whose literal last words denied reaching for his gun (an
assertion which was supported by other pieces of evidence)? Did the
195. Sarah Horner, Witness Testimony from the Jeronimo Yanez Trial: A
Summary, TWINCITIES PIONEER PRESS (July 5, 2017, 11:36 AM),
[https://perma.cc/CA3X-F59C] (“Viewed through that lens, [an expert at trial] said a
reasonable officer would not have viewed Castile as a threat, given that he politely
disclosed to Yanez that he was carrying a firearm, was traveling with a woman and
child in his car, and had no reason to believe he was being stopped for anything more
than a broken taillight. ‘There (was) absolutely no reason to believe Mr. Castile was
some kind of threat,’ [the expert] testified. ‘(Yanez was) stopping a motorist driving his
family home from shopping. . . . (Castile was) cooperative. He hands over his
insurance card. . . . He’s calm.’”).
196. Id.
197. Du, supra note 186.
198. When interviewed by the BCA, Kauser stated he was “absolutely”
surprised when Yanez began shooting. Complaint Details Moments Surrounding
Castile’s Fatal Shooting, CBS MINN. (Nov. 16, 2016, 1:43 PM),
[https://perma.cc/6MTY-DFLL].
199. Sarah Horner, Castile’s Girlfriend Testifies He Was Trying to Unbuckle
Seat Belt When Shot, TWINCITIES PIONEER PRESS (June 7, 2017, 2:50 PM),
[https://perma.cc/PY8S-9MTG].
200. Croft, supra note 173 (hyperlink includes embedded link of dash-cam
video).
201. Horner, supra note 195.
202. Chao Xiong, Expert: Jeronimo Yanez’s Actions in Killing Philando Castile
Were ‘Objectively Unreasonable,’ STARTRIBUNE (June 8, 2017, 9:28 AM),
[https://perma.cc/RN9Q-9VBM].
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jurors believe Yanez or did they believe Reynolds who during,
immediately after, and at trial consistently maintained Castile was
attempting to get his identification as instructed? In the end, it came
down to whether the jury believed the black victim and black
eyewitness or the non-black police officer.
From an evidentiary standpoint, Castile’s and Reynolds’s
statements during and following the incident were more trustworthy
than Yanez’s trial testimony. Not only were their statements less selfserving, the evidentiary principles behind these types of present sense
impressions and excited utterances deem them more reliable than
Yanez’s inconsistent statement at trial nearly one year after the
shooting. Present sense impressions are statements “describing or
explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the
declarant perceived it.”203 The theory behind this hearsay exception204 is
that a “substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.”205 In other
words, the declarant would not have the opportunity to forget the event
or fabricate the statement. When Castile and Reynolds made statements
during and immediately after the shooting, there was no time to
consider or contemplate a fabrication.
Excited utterances are statements “relating to a startling event or
condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
that it caused.”206 “The rationale of the excited utterance exception is
that the stress of nervous excitement or physical shock stills the
reflective faculties, thus removing an impediment to truthfulness.”207
Clearly, Yanez’s firing of seven bullets into the vehicle at close range—
some which fatally wounded Castile and one which struck one to two
inches from Reynolds, as well as one bullet which struck the back seat
where Reynolds’s four-year-old sat in her car seat208—constitutes a
startling event. Both Castile and Reynolds were unmistakably under the
stress of that event when they made their statements that Castile was
never reaching for his gun.
203. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
204. The analysis here is not whether the statements qualified under a hearsay
exception, but to apply evidence law principles to weigh the relative reliability of the
conflicting statements.
205. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note.
206. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
207. United States v. DeMarce, 564 F.3d 989, 997 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Reed v. Thalacker, 198 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 1999)).
208. Associated Press, The Latest: Expert: No Reason to Think Motorist a
Threat, WASH. TIMES (June 7, 2017), [https://perma.cc/7EEE-SMKG].

GONZALES ROSE – CAMERA READY (DO NOT DELETE)

2018:369

Racial Character Evidence

5/2/2018 11:15 AM

401

Further, under evidence law principles, Yanez’s own excited
utterances to a responding officer (who was sent to interview him) that
he did not know where Castile’s firearm was before firing his own gun
are particularly reliable. These statements are captured on the dash-cam
video where Yanez is unambiguously in an agitated state and can be
heard yelling, crying, and using frequent offensive expletives.209 From
an evidentiary standpoint, these statements are more trustworthy than
Yanez’s inconsistent testimony nearly a year later that he clearly saw
Castile’s firearm.
In determining whether to believe the black victim and black
witness or the non-black police officer, the jury chose the latter. There
was no indication that Philando Castile was violent, aggressive, or
likely to pull a gun on a police officer—except his blackness. There was
little to make Diamond Reynolds’s testimony not credible—except her
blackness. Despite the fact that both Yanez’s and Reynolds’s recorded
statements during and after the shooting indicate Yanez did not see a
gun and that deadly force was unreasonable,210 jurors believed the
officer over Diamond Reynolds.211 They believed Yanez even though
his testimony was impeached by his own recounting of the events both
at the scene and the next day. Despite this evidence in the record, the
jurors found Yanez more credible than Reynolds and Castile.212 This
outcome left many baffled;213 however, it makes sense when one
considers the role race plays in determinations of people’s character and
credibility.
C. Categorizing Racial Character Evidence
Racial character evidence can be grouped into at least three
categories: “inherent reliance,” “stereotype emphasis,” and “expert or
lay opinion.” Like many classifications, there is overlap. However, it is
useful to consider each type of racial character evidence individually
209. Croft, supra note 173.
210. See id.; Xiong, supra note 202.
211. See, e.g., Kent Erdahl, Yanez Juror: ‘State Didn’t Prove He Was
Dishonest,’ KARE 11 (June 20, 2017, 6:00 PM CDT), [https://perma.cc/QS9J-E2L5]
(“[A juror] says the jury largely struggled with Diamond Reynolds's credibility in court
. . . .”).
212. Id. (quoting one juror who stated, “[t]he state didn't prove he was
dishonest.”).
213. Croft, supra note 173. This CNN article includes an illustrative example:
“In a commentary Saturday, CNN legal analyst Joey Jackson asked, ‘[h]ow did a jury
not see what the rest of the world did? And why does, and how could, this continue to
happen? Will there ever be accountability?’” Id.
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since different types may warrant different evidentiary objections or
remediation. The Peña-Rodriguez case provides examples of racial
character evidence against defendants and witnesses, and the criminal
proceedings which followed the killings of Trayvon Martin, Michael
Brown, and Philando Castile demonstrate how racial character evidence
against victims is employed in self-defense and deadly force cases.
1. INHERENT RELIANCE
Juror H.C.’s statement “I think he did it because he’s Mexican”214
is an example of inherent reliance on racial character evidence made
explicit. The juror observed that the defendant was Latino (here, a
Mexican-born legal permanent resident of the United States),215 and on
the basis of this racial observation, believed that the defendant was the
type of person to commit sexual crimes against females. The inference
from this racial character evidence is that because the defendant had a
character propensity—due to his race—to commit sexual offenses
against girls and women, it was therefore likely he committed such
offenses against the female teenage victims on the evening in question.
Oftentimes, jurors will not overtly proclaim such inherent reliance
on race as a proxy for a person’s character because it is politically
incorrect or socially unacceptable in many circles. Thus, it is likely that
most inherent reliance on racial character evidence goes unspoken.
However, it might be revealed through widely-understood coded
language, such as referring to “immigrants,” “thugs,” or “those
people”216 to reference certain racialized populations, designate them as
“other,” and allude to moral and behavioral characteristics
stereotypically associated with the group. “Illegal,” “illegal
immigrants,” or simply “immigrants” are “racially discriminatory
codes for Hispanics.”217 It is widely understood that “thug” is a current

214. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017).
215. Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Top Court Backs Hispanic Man Over Juror’s
Racist Comments, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2017, 10:34 AM), [https://perma.cc/Y4A4RH6L].
216. See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED
RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS (2014)
(providing extensive analysis into coded language used to reference people of color and
embrace racial stereotypes).
217. Kevin R. Johnson, The Keyes to the Nation’s Educational Future: The
Latina/o Struggle for Educational Equity, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (2013)
(quoting Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1193 (M.D. Ala.
2011)); see generally Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The
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iteration of the “n-word.”218 “Through . . . code words it is possible to
play on racial stereotypes, appeal to racial fears, and heap blame on
blacks, other people of color, and immigrants without naming them.”219
This is equally true in politics and the jury box.
Similarly, racial “othering” and stereotyping can be achieved by
and revealed through jurors simply referring to people of color as
“they” and “those people.” For example, in the trial of a Hispanic man
for a robbery, a juror used coded language to discuss racial character of
Latinos stating, “I guess we’re profiling, but they cause all the
trouble.”220 Another example is the manner in which a white, female
juror in the trial of George Zimmerman repeatedly referred to the black
victim Trayvon Martin and the prosecution’s black witness Rachel
Jeantel as “they,” but defendant Zimmerman as “George.”221 She spoke
about “the type of life that they [live],” and “how they’re living, in the
environment that they’re living in.”222 At trial, the defense had
introduced evidence of robberies in Zimmerman’s apartment complex
that had been allegedly perpetrated by black males.223 The same juror
commented that “George Zimmerman is a man whose heart was in the
right place, but just got displaced by the vandalism in the neighborhood
and wanting to catch these people so badly he went above and beyond
what he should have done.”224 Again, she apparently used “these
people” to reference blacks, specifically suspected black burglars.
Despite occasional disclosures of racially coded language, inherent
reliance on racial character evidence is particularly insidious because it
is both difficult to detect and widespread. Since the racial character
evidence is “submitted” to the jury passively or disseminated by jurors
Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263
(1997).
218. Calvin John Smiley & David Fakunle, From “Brute” to “Thug:” The
Demonization and Criminalization of Unarmed Black Male Victims in America, 26 J.
HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV. 350, 350–51 (2016).
219. STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL JUSTICE
IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND POLICY 214 (2001).
220. United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
221. Carodine, supra note 2, at 688–89; Dan Zak, Who is Juror B37? Our Sole
Window—for Now—into the Zimmerman Verdict, WASH. POST (Jul. 16, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/who-is-juror-b37-our-sole-window-for-now--into-the-zimmerman-verdict/2013/07/16/7513eece-ee23-11e2-a1f9ea873b7e0424_story.html?utm_term=.985025c12a58.
222. Id.
223. Id.; Thompson, supra note 12, at 342.
224. Mark Mooney, George Zimmerman Juror Says His ‘Heart Was in the
Right Place,’ ABC NEWS (July 15, 2013), [https://perma.cc/W255-UAKA] (emphasis
added).
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behind the closed doors of the deliberation room, opposing counsel
cannot object. Furthermore, studies have uncovered that most
Americans harbor racial bias against people of color.225 Thus it is likely
that this racial bias is frequently relied upon when a defendant, victim,
or witness is a person of color.
Inherent reliance on racial character evidence is simply the way
implicit racial bias takes on evidentiary value. Implicit racial bias often
causes jurors to determine that a defendant or victim is prone to
violence or criminality simply by perceiving his or her race.226
Similarly, the credibility of witnesses and parties is often based on
observations of race. For instance, in Peña-Rodriguez, Juror H.C.
stated he “did not find petitioner’s alibi witness was credible because,
among other things, the witness was ‘an illegal.’”227 The alibi witness
was a legal permanent resident of the United States,228 but this juror
relied on a pervasive racial stereotype that Latinos, especially those of
Mexican origin or descent, are not lawfully present229 and therefore not
honest or trustworthy. “[J]ury trials are all about character,” and a
central function of juries is to make character judgments.230 Juries use
225. See, e.g., CHERYL STAATS, KIRWAN INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE:
IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2014 19, 72 (2014), [https://perma.cc/D597-NLVB] (“Extensive
research has uncovered a pro-White/anti-Black bias in most Americans, regardless of
their own racial group. Moreover, researchers have even documented this bias in
children, including those as young as six years old.”); see generally MAHZARIN R.
BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE
(2016).
226. See Thompson, supra note 12, at 329–30. According to Thompson:
Data collected from the Race IAT [Implicit Association Test] indicate that
approximately 88 percent of White Americans harbor some level of implicit
bias against African-Americans. Interestingly, the data also indicate that 48
percent of African-Americans show a bias in favor of White Americans.
While these statistics are startling, they should not be read to suggest that
88 percent of Whites and 48 percent of Blacks hold racist attitudes toward
African-Americans; however, several scientific studies have found that IAT
results are at least a moderate predictor of behavior. Thus, in some
instances, individuals who hold implicit biases against African-Americans
may act upon those biases when engaging in decision-making . . . .
Id.
227. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017).
228. Id.
229. The stereotype that Latinos are unlawfully present in the United States is
both common and unfounded. See Angela M. Banks, The Curious Relationship Between
“Self-Deportation” Policies and Naturalization Rates, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1149, 1192 (2012).
230. Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming Good Character Evidence
to Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 229 (2004).
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shortcuts to determine the credibility of witnesses, and these shortcuts
include factors based on racial biases.231
2. RACIAL STEREOTYPE EMPHASIS
Racial character evidence can also be introduced more directly at
grand jury or trial by attorneys who seek to persuade the jury that a
racial minority’s character is consistent with racial stereotypes. This
sort of character evidence is often utilized in cases where a defendant
asserts self-defense or warranted use of force against a victim of color.
Instead of restricting themselves to the facts of what occurred during
the incident in question which allegedly led the defendant to reasonably
fear for his or her safety or the safety of others, prosecutors (who
begrudgingly pursue criminal charges) and defense counsel subtly try to
show that the victim was stereotypically black or brown.
a. Stereotypical Blackness
A victim (or witness’s) blackness or brownness is emphasized by
presenting “evidence” of the victim’s dress, appearance, interests, and
activities that are perceived as consistent with racial stereotypes and in
turn play on the jurors’ implicit biases.232 It would be unheard of for a
young white female to be perceived as violent, aggressive, or otherwise
threatening to law enforcement or the “neighborhood watch” for
wearing a hoodie, listening to hip-hop music, playing basketball,
experimenting with marijuana, or using popular slang on social media.
The same is not true for a victim of color. A black victim’s mere
interest or involvement in activities stereotypically associated with
black people or culture can typify the victim as stereotypically black
and possessing all the racialized characteristics associated with
blackness, including being dangerous and threatening.233
For instance, when George Zimmerman was prosecuted for killing
black seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin, defense counsel attempted to
introduce photos of Trayvon wearing “urban”234 style clothing such as
231. Id. at 231.
232. See Thompson, supra note 12, at 322.
233. See Lacy, supra note 116, at 564.
234. It should be noted that “urban” attire is often a racialized code word
referring to clothing stereotypically associated with African Americans although such
clothing is commonly worn by people of all races. See generally, Kimberly A.
Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About
Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 413–14 (2006).
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baggy pants and hooded sweatshirts, smoking what was assumed to be
marijuana, wearing a “grill” of removable gold teeth, and “flipping
off” the camera bare-chested or in a white tank top displaying tattoos.235
They also acquired photos from his social media account of a marijuana
plant, and of a gun in the hand of an unidentified black person.236 The
defense also sought to introduce evidence that Trayvon had been
suspended from school for marijuana paraphernalia, received bad
grades, and got into fights at school, as well as text messages where he
referenced guns, fights, marijuana, and used certain slang lingo.237
These photos, school records, and texts were primarily relevant to
showing that Trayvon was a stereotypical black youth, and thus should
be presumed to have been a threat to Zimmerman. Although much of
this evidence was excluded pretrial in this case,238 it still serves as
examples of the type of racial character evidence that might be
introduced at trials without appropriate objection.
Racial character evidence can also be raised at trial by the manner
in which counsel questions a witness and signals to the jury that the
witness is a stereotypical racial minority, and hence not credible. This
occurred in the Zimmerman trial when the prosecution’s key witness,
Rachel Jeantel—a black friend who had been speaking to Trayvon while
Zimmerman followed him—was cross-examined.239 As scholars have
observed, Zimmerman’s counsel employed cross-examination tactics to
show that she was “less educated and less articulate,” and accordingly
“less believable than similarly situated white witnesses.”240 These
tactics included a harsh tone, aggressive questioning techniques,
requiring her to read out-loud when she had English literacy

235. See, e.g., Jonathon Capehart, Pictures Put Trayvon Martin on Trial,
WASH. POST (May 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpartisan/wp/2013/05/28/pictures-put-trayvon-martin-ontrial/?utm_term=.34f099228855; Michael Pearson & David Mattingly, Gun, Drug
Texts Feature in New Trayvon Martin Shooting Evidence, CNN (May 26, 2013, 1:21
PM), [https://perma.cc/NE44-7RU9].
236. Pearson & Mattingly, supra note 235.
237. Id.; Casey Glynn, George Zimmerman Lawyers Seek Trayvon Martin’s
School Records, Social Media Accounts, CBS NEWS (Oct. 19, 2012, 11:28 AM),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180402025248/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/george
-zimmerman-lawyers-seek-trayvon-martins-school-records-social-media-accounts/].
238. Josh Levs, Graham Winch & Victim Blackwell, Marijuana, Fights, Guns:
Zimmerman Loses Key Pretrial Battles, CNN (May 29, 2013, 6:40 AM),
[https://perma.cc/EG2K-W6U9].
239. Tina Susman, A Tense Cross-Examination in George Zimmerman Trial,
L.A. TIMES (June 27, 2013), [https://perma.cc/KSV6-L2P5].
240. Carodine, supra note 2, at 687.
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difficulties, and repeating back her testimony as if he was providing
verbal captioning to highlight the differences in her speech in
comparison to his as a white, middle-aged, highly-educated male.241
The attorney’s tone and questions implied not merely that Jeantel was
mistaken or biased, but that she was “unintelligent and thus not
credible.”242 Jeantel is a multilingual immigrant whose first language is
not English.243 Instead of casting her in the light of a multilingual,
English language learner, she was portrayed as “ignorant, ‘stupid,’ and
a liar,”244 playing into a racist stereotype of black girls.245 “The
message that Zimmerman’s lawyer sent the jury was that she looked
and sounded different and so must be lying because she was not ‘one of
us.’”246
The racializing effect of Zimmerman’s attorney’s crossexamination of Jeantel is not speculative. “Jeantel was almost
immediately attacked on social media for her appearance, speech, and
perceived level of intelligence,”247 and criticized as “stereotypically
black” by whites and blacks alike.248 “Social media was set ablaze with
criticism of Jeantel for being stereotypically Black—uneducated,
hostile, inarticulate, angry toward Whites, lazy, and a thug—and it is
possible that the jurors made similar assessments about Martin’s
character.”249 In a post-trial interview with a Zimmerman juror, the
juror reported that she felt Jeantel was not credible due to her lack of
education and communication skills and condescendingly stated she felt
pity for Jeantel and perceived Jeantel to be embarrassed by her
educational and communication shortcomings.250 This reveals how

241. See id. at 688–89.
242. Id. at 688.
243. See Grace Sullivan, In Your Own Words: Investigating Voice,
Intertextuality, and Credibility of Rachel Jeantel in the George Zimmerman Trial, 1
PROC. LINGUISTIC SOC’Y AM. 13:6 (2016).
244. Carodine, supra note 2, at 689.
245. MONIQUE W. MORRIS, PUSHOUT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK GIRLS
IN SCHOOLS 43 (2016) (discussing widely accepted stereotypes of black females “as less
intelligent, hypersexual, loud, sassy, ‘ghetto,’ or domestic”).
246. Carodine, supra note 2, at 688 (quoting Kristin A. Randall, The George
Zimmerman Trial: Witness Rachel Jeantel, MENTAL HEALTH & CRIM. JUST. (July 1,
2013), [https://perma.cc/WRJ5-2TH8]).
247. Thompson, supra note 12, at 337.
248. Id. at 337–38. See also Jelani Cobb, Rachel Jeantel on Trial, NEW
YORKER (June 27, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/rachel-jeantelon-trial.
249. Thompson, supra note 12, at 338.
250. Id. at 340–41.
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“Jeantel’s failure to present herself in accordance with White-specific
[not to mention native English-speaker] norms very likely influenced
[the jurors’] assessment of the characters of both Jeantel and Martin.”251
b. The “Black Brute” or “Thug” Stereotype
In self-defense and deadly use of force cases, one of the most
harmful uses of racial character evidence is emphasis of the centuriesold stereotype of African American victims as black “brutes” or
“thugs.” Stereotypes of blacks as larger, stronger, and more dangerous
than other races serve to justify their killing as reasonable. The racist
black “brute,” “beast,” “fiend,” or “demon” stereotype has a long
history in the United States.252 This stereotype has been proliferated
through literature, journalism, and the law from the time of slavery to
the present.253 “The brute caricature portrays Black men as innately
savage, animalistic, destructive, and criminal—deserving punishment,
maybe death.”254 The purpose of this characterization is “to invoke fear
on the part of the White audience, and to justify repressive measures
towards Black Americans.”255 This stereotype has resulted in a
persistent fear of black criminality which has manifested as white flight
and the characterization of black youth as “super-predators.”256
Although facially race-neutral, the term “super-predator” has been
identified as racist,257 but new terms such as “thug” have emerged in its
place. “Thug” is modern terminology for “black brute.”258
“The ‘black brute’ stereotype may be one of the most enduring in
this nation’s history and persists even today.”259 However, most people,
251. Id. at 339.
252. See generally Marion L. Dawson, The South and the Negro, 172 N. AM.
REV. 279 (1901).
253. Ryan P. Alford, Appellate Review of Racist Summations: Redeeming the
Promise of Searching Analysis, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 345 (2006).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 346.
257. Michael E. Jennings, Trayvon Martin and the Myth of Superpredator: A
Note on African American Males as Problems in American Society, in TRAYVON
MARTIN, RACE, AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 191, 193 (Kenneth J. Fsaching-Varner et al.
eds., 2014) (“The animal imagery summoned by the superpredator label, however, had
strong racial overtones that linked African American males to a predatory culture
lacking in moral character and committed to violent consumption.” (citing MARC
MAURER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2006))).
258. See Smiley & Fakunle, supra note 218, at 350–51, 354.
259. Alford, supra note 253, at 346 (“[N]ot only is the stereotype of the Black
brute current within American society, but that in all its iterations, including those that
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including jurors, are unaware of their reliance on this stereotype in
assessing black victims. Whites perceive black men as bigger, taller,
heavier, stronger, and more dangerous than similarly-sized white
men.260 In fact, whites are more likely to go as far as to attribute
superhuman abilities, including strength and endurance, to blacks than
other racial groups.261
Implicit bias against blacks is accompanied by implicit bias in
favor of whites. The pervasiveness of the black brute, black-asdangerous-criminal and preference for whites as innocent and virtuous
has been proven through many studies. For instance, Implicit
Association Tests (IATs) show that nearly seventy-five percent of test
takers demonstrate implicit bias in favor of whites and against blacks.262
Further, test participants are more likely to associate blackness with
guilt in comparison to whiteness to the point “‘that the [Guilty/Not
Guilty] IAT scores predicted participants’ evidence judgments.’”263
More specifically, numerous studies have found that “individuals are
quicker to identify weapons and slower to recognize harmless objects,
like tools, in the hands of Black persons than in the hands of White
persons.”264
Implicit racial bias265 both causes police officers to kill black
people and jurors to later fail to indict or convict the police officers.
serve to ‘racially construct’ Latino and other minority youth, it has been proven to be
one of the most enduring and powerful stereotypes in the nation's history.”).
260. A 2017 study published in the American Psychological Association’s
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology showed that white people perceived black
men as more muscular, heavier, taller, stronger and more dangerous than white men
the same size and weight. See Ben Guarino, People See Black Men as Larger and
Stronger than White Men – Even When They’re Not, Study Says, WASH. POST (Mar. 14,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2017/03/14/psychologists-we-see-black-men-as-larger-and-stronger-than-whitemen-even-when-theyre-not/?utm_term=.a5f9bd8de0dd.
261. J.C. Sevcik, Study Shows White People Think Black People Are
Superhuman, Magical, UPI (Nov. 14, 2014, 8:27 PM), [https://perma.cc/KL4E-ASSZ]
(discussing Adam Waytz, Kelly Marie Hoffman & Sophie Trawalter, A
Superhumanization Bias in Whites’ Perceptions of Blacks, 6 SOC. PYSCH. &
PERSONALITY SCI. 352 (2014)).
262. Lee, supra note 126, at 861.
263. JUSTIN D. LEVINSON & ROGER J. SMITH, IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS
THE LAW 22–23 (2012); Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty By
Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 187, 206 (2010).
264. Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a
Not-Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1582 (2013).
265. Implicit bias is “unintentional bias arising from ‘attitudes or stereotypes
that affect our understanding, decision–making, and behavior, without our even
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Since blackness itself signifies criminality and danger and whiteness
represents virtue, as Blanche Cook has observed: “In the grip of
implicit bias, the black body itself becomes evidence of the crime and
danger, and the white body becomes evidence of innocence and
righteousness.”266 Race itself is evidence that the victim of color was
threatening and that the officer was justified in responding with deadly
force.
Police officers’ defense counsel and prosecutors who only
reluctantly pursue charges against police introduce racial character
evidence by relying on the black brute stereotype and coded appeals to
rouse racial fear and discrimination by jurors who are
disproportionately white. An example of this is the grand jury
proceedings against white officer Darren Wilson who shot to death
unarmed black eighteen-year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson,
Missouri.
At the grand jury proceedings, the prosecution acted more like
“defense counsel,”267 and allowed Wilson to offer a fantastical story
portraying Brown as a mystical black superhuman brute and demon
without being subject to cross-examination.268 Specifically, Wilson
testified that on August 9, 2014, while patrolling in his marked police
SUV he noticed two young men, Brown and his friend Dorian Johnson,
walking in the middle of the street.269 Wilson stopped his vehicle a
couple of feet in front of them and asked why they did not use the
sidewalk.270 Johnson said they were almost to their destination, and
Brown responded with “vulgar language.”271
Wilson then noticed a box of cigarillos in Brown’s hand and that
Johnson was wearing a black shirt consistent with a recent report of a

realizing it.” Id. at 1559 n.23 (citing Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012)).
266. Cook, supra note 12, at 604, 611–12.
267. Id. at 570.
268. Damien Cave, Officer Darren Wilson’s Grand Jury Testimony in
Ferguson,
Mo.,
Shooting,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
25,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/25/us/darren-wilson-testimony-fergusonshooting.html.
269. Krishnadev Calamur, Ferguson Documents: Officer Darren Wilson’s
Testimony,
NPR
(Nov.
25,
2014,
6:52
AM),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180402030109/https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2014/11/25/366519644/ferguson-docs-officer-darren-wilsons-testimony].
270. Transcript of Grand Jury Volume V at 208, Missouri v. Wilson (Sept. 16,
2014), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1370569/grand-jury-volume-5.pdf.
271. Id.
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theft of a box of cigarillos from a convenience store.272 Wilson testified
that he began to open his door and asked Brown to “come here for a
minute.”273 Brown allegedly responded by swearing and slamming the
door shut.274 According to Wilson, he then tried to open the door again
while Brown stared at him as if “to overpower” him with an “intense
face,” eventually slamming the door and physically attacking Wilson
through the open SUV window with full swing punches while still
holding the box of cigarillos.275 According to Wilson, Brown then
handed the cigarillos to Johnson and continued to punch him through
the vehicle’s window.276 Wilson explained that “when I grabbed him,
the only way I can describe it is I felt like a five-year-old holding onto
Hulk Hogan.”277 Wilson reported that he then drew his firearm
threatening to shoot Brown if he did not stop.278 Wilson claims that
Brown responded by saying “you are too much of a pussy to shoot
me,” then grabbed at Wilson’s gun, and Wilson fired the gun.279 Wilson
testified Brown then looked up at him and “had the most intense
aggressive face. The only way I can describe it, it looks like a demon,
that’s how angry he looked. He comes back towards me again with his
hands up.”280
Wilson said he then fired a second time, and Brown struck him
again through the window, and then ran off.281 Wilson testified he
pursued Brown and ordered him to get on the ground.282 Brown
supposedly did not comply but instead he allegedly:
[T]urn[ed], and when he looked at me, he made like a
grunting, like aggravated sound and, he starts, he turns and
he’s coming back towards me . . . he kind of does like a
stutter step to start running. . . his left hand goes in a fist and

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 202, 209.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 209–11, 216.
Id. at 211–13.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 214, 224.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
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goes to his side, his right one goes under his shirt in his
waistband and he starts running at me.283

Wilson testified he then fired a series of shots hitting Brown.284
Wilson went on to say that Brown’s body jerked and, despite being
shot, that he was “still coming at me, he hadn’t slowed down.”285
Wilson then fired another round of shots, which struck Brown again.286
Officer Wilson testified that:
[A]t this point it looked like he was almost bulking up to run
through the shots, like it was making him mad that I’m
shooting at him. And the face that he had was looking straight
through me, like I wasn’t even there, I wasn’t even anything
in his way. Well he kept coming at me . . . .287
Wilson shot at Brown twelve times leaving only one bullet remaining in
his service revolver.288
In his grand jury testimony, Wilson conveyed a story of a
superhuman assailant who, despite being unarmed, repeatedly attacked
a police officer with no provocation except having been asked to walk
on the sidewalk and a guilty conscience of, at most, having reaching
over a counter and taken a box of cigarillos.289 When the officer
brandished his weapon and threatened to shoot, Brown allegedly
responded with vulgar insults. Wilson described Brown’s expression as
demonic, stating that it was “the most intense aggressive face.”290
According to Wilson, Brown could resist bullets, which did not slow
him down and only made him angrier, requiring a second round of
shots to stop him. Like a possessed beast, Brown allegedly grunted,
made aggravated sounds, bulked up, and charged forward undaunted by
bullet wounds. Wilson’s description of Brown’s expressions, strength,
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY
FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 15–16 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RVP-YC4K].
289. See Transcript of Grand Jury Volume V, supra note 270, at 153–57.
290. Id. at 225.
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and actions “feed into the stereotypical portrayal of the Black man as a
brutish, animalistic character.”291 They served to provoke racial fear in
the grand jurors so that they would find Wilson’s firing of a dozen
rounds into an unarmed teenager reasonable.
Instances of racial character evidence that relies on the black brute
stereotype abound. Even younger black children are not immune to this
dangerous stereotype. For example, in the grand jury proceedings
concerning the police shooting of Tamir Rice, the twelve-year-old black
child shot to death in Cleveland after someone had reported him playing
with a gun that was later confirmed to be a toy, was described by
prosecutors (who were tasked with bringing the white officers to justice
for killing Tamir) as big, scary, and adult-like.292 A 2016 study found
that faces of black children as young as five years old triggered
thoughts of guns and violence.293
Racialized code words and characterizations are racial character
evidence employed to show that the victim was a black brute or demon
that would terrify a reasonable police officer and deserved to be killed.
“When such ‘code’ words trigger the implicit racial bias in jurors, it
can become automatic to view the Black male as an animalistic brute
with such great strength that deadly force was required in order to
preserve the life of the officer.”294 Emphasis on racialized stereotypes,
albeit veiled in code words, is a type of racial character evidence that
can be relied upon by a jury in deciding not to indict or to acquit in
police killing cases.
3. EXPERT OR LAY OPINION
Attorneys are not the only ones who submit racial character
evidence to the jury; jurors can also take on that endeavor in the
deliberation room. In Peña-Rodriguez, Juror H.C. actually presented
“expert” opinion and lay opinion evidence about the racial character of
“Mexicans” to his fellow jurors. In his lay opinion, he gave evidence

291. Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias:
Can’t We All Just Get Along, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 339, 371 (2015).
292. Daniel Marans, How a Prosecutor Managed to Blame a 12-Year-Old for
Getting Killed by a Cop, HUFFPOST (Dec. 29, 2015), [https://perma.cc/YU5X-PTUU].
293. Andrew R. Todd, Kelsey C. Thiem & Rebecca Neel, Does Seeing Faces
of Young Black Boys Facilitate the Identification of Threatening Stimuli?, 27 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 384, 391 (2016).
294. Lawson, supra note 291, at 371.
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that “Mexican men take whatever they want.”295 Specific to the
criminal charges in the case, he stated that “Mexican men [are]
physically controlling of women because they have a sense of
entitlement and think they can ‘do whatever they want’ with women.”296
He also gave expert opinion testimony in deliberations. Based upon his
former law enforcement background, he said that he “believed that the
defendant was guilty because in his experience as an ex-law
enforcement officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to
believe they could do whatever they wanted with women.”297 He
explained that “where he used to patrol, nine times out of ten Mexican
men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls.”298
Thus, in Peña-Rodriguez, a juror served as a pseudo lay and
expert witness as to the racial character of men of Mexican origin. In
his opinion, men of Mexican ancestry have a character propensity to be
aggressive toward women and girls; possess a bravado and sense of
entitlement; and have a tendency to take whatever they want from and
do whatever they want to females. He further concluded that since the
defendant was Mexican, he must have acted in accordance with a
Mexican character propensity for sexual offenses against women and
girls during the event in question, and accordingly was guilty of
unlawful sexual contact and sexual harassment in the present case. This
is a prime example of how character evidence can be submitted to the
jury in the form of expert or lay opinion testimony.
Jurors are not the only individuals who might serve as expert or
lay opinion racial character witnesses. Sometimes actual witnesses—
whether expert or lay—in the trial will testify as to racial character
evidence. An example is Dr. Walter Quijano, a psychologist in Texas
who, for twenty years, “used defendants’ race as a factor in
determining whether [blacks and Hispanics] are likely to commit crimes
in the future.”299 He based this conclusion on prison statistics that racial
minorities are disproportionately incarcerated in comparison to the
general population.300 Dr. Quijano testified at numerous trials that black

295. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 350 P.3d 287, 289 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137
S. Ct. 855 (2017).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Raju Chebium, Texas Psychologist Speaks Out About His Testimony on
Race and Crime, CNN (June 9, 2000, 6:56 PM), [https://perma.cc/5DYC-7U59].
300. Id.
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and brown people are more prone to violence than people of other
races.301
In one such case, Duane Buck had been convicted of capital
murder and faced the death penalty.302 State court juries in Texas can
only impose a death sentence if they unanimously agree beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant is likely to commit future violence
that constitutes a threat to society.303 Buck’s attorney called Dr.
Quijano, who had been appointed by the trial judge to conduct a
psychological evaluation of the defendant, to testify as an expert
witness about the likelihood of Buck’s future violence.304 Although Dr.
Quijano ultimately testified Buck was not likely to be dangerous in the
future, he testified “that one of the factors pertinent in assessing a
person’s propensity for violence was his race, and that Buck was
statistically more likely to act violently because he is black.”305 Buck
was sentenced to death by the jury.306 In a prior case, Dr. Quijano, had
testified that a defendant’s Hispanic heritage “was a factor weighing in
favor of future dangerousness.”307 These are unambiguous examples of
expert witness racial character evidence. Race itself is used as proof of
a person’s propensity to be dangerous or violent. Such expert witness
testimony about racial character evidence is impermissible and
oftentimes unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently issued an opinion
in Buck v. Davis.308 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts
rejected this expert opinion testimony of racial character evidence.309
The Court observed that, according to Dr. Quijano, Buck’s “immutable
characteristic [of race] carried with it an ‘increased probability’ of
future violence.”310 The Court found that “[i]t would be patently
301. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 770 (2017). It should be noted that Dr.
Quijano was not simply articulating a personal perspective, rather he was adopting the
narrative of black dangerousness which has long been a popular philosophy used to
justify black captivity. See Brief for the Nat’l Black Law Students Ass’n as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2–4, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (No. 158049), 2016 WL 4073688.
302. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 767.
303. Id. at 768.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 767.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 769; Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 884–85 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
308. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
309. Id. at 777.
310. Id. at 776.
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unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to be a
future danger because of his race.”311 This reasoning should apply to
bar the use of race as character evidence of propensity for violence
against victims in police killing cases.
It should be noted that similar to jurors and experts, lay witnesses
could also potentially provide opinion evidence of racial character. This
could materialize, for instance, as a generalization that people from
certain black or Latino neighborhoods are known for a culture of
violence, drug distribution, or gang membership. It could also manifest
as generalizations about what particular American Indian tribe
members, groups of Asian Americans, or immigrants act like or what
activities they engage in.
III.

RACIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE: A CIVIL RIGHTS PROBLEM

Juror reliance on racial character evidence in police killing cases is
both a racial justice and an evidence law problem requiring
constitutional and evidence law analysis and responses. Existing case
law addressing jurors’ consideration of racial character evidence—
namely, Peña-Rodriguez—fails to address the scenario in which racial
character evidence is considered against a victim of color to support a
no true bill312 or acquittal. A persuasive argument can be made that
discriminatory acquittals based on racial character evidence violate
victims’ constitutional right of equal protection. However, because of
the fact that the competing constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy, coupled with juror immunity, forecloses post-acquittal
remedies, pre-verdict evidence solutions are particularly needed.
A. Constitutionality of Racial Character Evidence Against Victims
1. THE PROMISE AND LIMITATIONS OF PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO
Writing for the Court in Peña-Rodriguez, Justice Kennedy
discussed two types of historical juror racial bias: discriminatory
convictions of blacks and discriminatory acquittals of whites.313 The
Court denounced the pervasive practice where “[a]ll-white juries
311. Id. at 775.
312. A no true bill is the grand jury’s finding that there is no probable cause to
support formal criminal charges against a potential defendant. Andrew D. Leipold, Why
Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 266
(1995).
313. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017).
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punished black defendants particularly harshly, while simultaneously
refusing to punish violence by whites, including Ku Klux Klan
members, against blacks . . . .”314 The Court pointed to a poignant
example from post-Civil War Texas: Between 1865 and 1866, five
hundred prosecutions of white defendants who had been charged with
killing blacks were presented to all-white juries, and every single white
defendant was acquitted.315 In response to this dramatic example of
discriminatory acquittals, the Court concluded that “[t]he stark and
unapologetic nature of race-motivated outcomes challenged the
American belief that ‘the jury was a bulwark of liberty.’”316
Although the Peña-Rodriguez Court denounced the racial bias
against black victims that privileges non-black defendants and results in
discriminatory acquittals, the Court’s remedy does not address this type
of juror bias. The Court found that a juror’s racial bias against the
defendant and his alibi witness deprived the defendant of an impartial
jury as required by the Sixth Amendment.317 Colorado Rule of Evidence
606(b), which is very similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
prevents jurors from impeaching their verdict.318 Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b) and its state equivalents, known as juror noimpeachment rules, provide that jurors:
[M]ay not testify about any statement made or incident that
occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything
on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental
processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may
not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s
statement on these matters.319
A minority of jurisdictions have allowed a racial bias exception to
Rule 606(b), but most have not.320 Peña-Rodriguez changed this. The
Court held that:
[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or
she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 877–78.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865.
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criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the noimpeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court
to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any
resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.321

Thus, evidence of juror testimony and affidavits at the trial level
asserting that Juror H.C. had stated that defendant Peña-Rodriguez was
guilty of sexual offenses because he was Mexican and that his Latino
alibi witness (who was a legal permanent resident) was not credible
because he was an “illegal,” among other anti-Latino comments, were
admissible evidence.322 This evidence is admissible despite Rule
606(b)’s bar because the statements were “egregious” and
“unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias,” thereby violating the
Constitution.323 As a result, jurors can now testify about blatant racial
bias of their fellow jurors during deliberations after a verdict of guilty
has been entered.
However, jurors are still barred from testifying about such racial
bias when the defendant is acquitted for two reasons: (1) PeñaRodriguez addresses only convictions, and (2) there is a lack of feasible
post-verdict remedies. The racial bias exception to juror noimpeachment rules, articulated in Peña-Rodriguez, is based upon the
Sixth Amendment impartiality clause.324 The Sixth Amendment
guarantees criminal defendants (“the accused”) the right to an impartial
jury325 but does not protect the rights of victims. Thus, Peña-Rodriguez
does not directly apply to cases where juries discriminatorily acquit
police officers for the killing of people of color.
However, Peña-Rodriguez does provide precedential support for
juridical recognition that juror racial bias against victims violates equal
protection and that no-impeachment evidence rules should thus be made
to yield to the equal protection components of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Peña-Rodriguez Court discussed how racial
discrimination by jurors, which resulted in white defendants being
acquitted for the killing of blacks, was a type of “racial discrimination
in the jury system [which] posed a particular threat both to the promise
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and to the integrity of the jury trial.”326

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 869.
Id. at 870.
Id.
Id. at 869.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867.
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The constitutional right of equal protection exists, among other
reasons, to protect victims of crime from racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system. As Randall Kennedy has observed:
A core purpose of the 1866 Equal Protection Clause was to
affirm the rights of black victims of crime; the central idea
was not merely to prevent the states from treating black
criminal suspects, defendants, and convicts worse than white
ones, but also (and perhaps even more emphatically) to
guarantee that black victims of crime receive the same
protection as white victims. Of course, things didn’t quite
work out that way, and for the next hundred years, whitedominated police forces, grand juries, and petit juries often
contrived to look the other way when blacks were victimized
by crime—especially in the South, where racist whites
terrorized blacks in a regime marked by lynchings and nooses
and burning crosses.327
Moreover, Tania Tetlow has persuasively argued that
discriminatory acquittals violate the Equal Protection Clause.328 “A jury
may not constitutionally acquit based on discrimination against the
victims of the crime any more than that jury could constitutionally
convict a defendant based on discrimination.”329 Jurors serve as state
actors when they render verdicts,330 and it is “one of the most basic
tenets of equal protection law that state actors may not discriminate
based upon race or gender, particularly within criminal trials.”331
When a jury acquits a police officer based upon racial
discrimination against a victim, the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the law is violated.332 As the Supreme Court has
explained, “[d]iscrimination on the basis of race, odious in all respects,
is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.”333 Permitting
juror racial bias “damages ‘both the fact and the perception’ of the
jury’s role as ‘a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by
327. Akhil Reed Amar, Book Review, Three Cheers (and Two Quibbles) for
Professor Kennedy, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1256, 1261–62 (1998) (citing RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 41–62 (1997)).
328. Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, supra note 15.
329. Id. at 79–80.
330. Id. at 80, 106.
331. Id. at 80.
332. Id. at 107–08.
333. Id. at 107 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
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the State.’”334 As the Supreme Court has recently cautioned, juror racial
bias is “a familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would
risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.” Just as the Court’s
recognition and effort to address juror racial bias against defendants
were necessary “to ensure that our legal system remains capable of
coming ever closer to the promise of equal treatment under the law that
is so central to a functioning democracy,”335 it is also necessary to
correct juror racial bias against victims, particularly victims of state
violence.
It is time that the courts explicitly recognize that racially
discriminatory acquittals violate victims’ equal protection rights.
However, even if this were to happen, a racial bias exception to the noimpeachment evidence rules would not be an effective evidence law
remedy due to the lack of available post-verdict remedies. Even if
jurors are allowed to impeach their not-guilty verdict, and it is
determined that juror racial bias against the victim (and possibly
corresponding racial bias in favor of the defendant) led to a
discriminatory acquittal, the defendant still cannot be retried due to the
Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: “nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .
. . .”336 The primary protection under this clause is prohibition against
retrial for the same offense after an acquittal.337 Thus, a white police
defendant who was acquitted on the basis that jurors were racially
biased against the victim could not be retried.
In addition to the limitation of criminal post-verdict remedies,
under the current system, there cannot be any civil rights action against
jurors for a violation of the victim’s equal protection rights because
jurors have absolute immunity for acts performed within the scope of
their official duties.338
The Peña-Rodriguez decision was a positive step forward in
addressing juror racial bias—specifically, juror reliance on racial
character evidence—which results in discriminatory convictions.
However, the Court did not address discriminatory acquittals. In other
words, the opinion does not address the modern version of mid-

334. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) (quoting Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 411 (1991)).
335. Id.
336. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
337. See Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 318 (2013).
338. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1976).
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nineteenth century juror bias in favor of white defendants who killed
blacks. Today’s crisis of unaccountability for police killings of people
of color is the contemporary version of racially discriminatory
acquittals, and a particularly concerning one given that the defendants
are state actors. Therefore, despite Peña-Rodriguez, juror racial bias
remains a serious problem that needs to be addressed. Specifically,
since most post-acquittal remedies are foreclosed, pre-verdict evidence
law solutions are required.
IV.

EVIDENCE LAW SOLUTIONS TO RACIAL CHARACTER
EVIDENCE

The crisis of police killings of people of color in the United States
is a complex problem that requires a multitude of remedial approaches.
This Article looks at the problem from only one subfield—that of
evidence law—and hence proposes evidence law solutions. At first
glance, this prescriptive response might appear limited to the trial stage
of prosecution, since evidence rules and doctrines primarily govern the
admissibility of evidence at trial. Evidence law solutions could affect all
stages of a prosecution, however, including the initial decision to
pursue charges.
Prosecutors may choose not to zealously prosecute police officers
who kill community members of color for a variety reasons, such as a
reluctance to prosecute law enforcement officers with whom they
work,339 due to public opinion,340 or because they do not think they will
be able to prove the suspect is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
latter determination is based, in large part, on the availability and
strength of evidence. The circumscription of attorneys’ use of and factfinders’ reliance on racial character evidence will affect the availability
and strength of sources of proof. If, for instance, attorneys, jurors, and
judges are discouraged from using or relying on a victim’s blackness to
prove the victim posed a threat to the officer a guilty verdict might
become more attainable.
This Part first looks at the need for critical race evidence education
to enable attorneys and judges to recognize racial character evidence. It
pauses to consider the unique obstacles to confronting racial character
evidence at the grand jury stage before outlining evidentiary objections
339. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of
Unjustified Police Killings: Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
397, 416–17 (2017).
340. Id. at 409–10.
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to racial character evidence. This includes objections on the grounds of
improper character evidence, relevance, unfair prejudice, and
inappropriate expert witness and lay opinion testimony. This Part also
advocates for permissive use of rebuttal evidence of victims’ good
character and the use of jury instructions addressing implicit bias and
racial character evidence.
A. Need for Critical Race Evidence Education
Irrespective of the form that racial character evidence takes, it is
always impermissible. Attorneys’ use and jurors’ reliance on racial
character evidence usually go unnoticed, however, since most attorneys
and judges are unaware of its existence and how it violates
constitutional and evidence law. Awareness of the existence, effect, and
unlawful nature of racial character evidence is necessary to ensure that
proper evidentiary objections are asserted, rebuttal evidence of victims’
good character is introduced, and the jury is properly instructed to
disregard racial character evidence.
The first step to addressing racial character evidence is being able
to recognize it and explain how it relates to racial bias. This is no easy
task. Most often, racial character evidence is transmitted subtly, relied
upon implicitly, or even generated in the secrecy of jury deliberations.
Attorneys’ use of stereotype emphasis or expert (or lay) opinion
testimony on racial character are the most straightforward, but they still
require a sophisticated understanding of how racialization and racism
operate in contemporary society. Training on and study of critical race
theory (CRT) and its application to evidence law and practice is useful
to identifying and understanding the impact of racial character evidence
in all of its expressions.341
In applying CRT to evidence law, we must answer a two-part
“subordination question”: “(1) whether a rule of law or legal
doctrine, practice, or custom [of evidence] subordinates
important interests and concerns of racial minorities and (2) if
so, how is this problem best remedied?” Derrick Bell’s
theories of the pervasiveness and permanence of racism
prompt us to be inquisitive. Even if a rule of evidence appears
race-neutral on its face or in its application, we scrutinize it.
CRT asserts that our justice system serves to protect and
341. For a comprehensive discussion on the application of critical race theory
to evidence law, see Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2248–60.
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preserve existing power structures that ensure “insiders”
remain in power and benefit from the subordination of
“outsiders.” We can test this hypothesis in the realm of
evidence by asking: Are racial “insiders,” such as whites,
privileged under our evidentiary system? Specifically, does
our system favor evidence proffered by whites or evidence
infused with racism—both of which ultimately benefit white
people as a group? Does it disfavor evidence introduced by
people of color or evidence that attempts to bring embedded
racism to light?342
Law school courses and continuing legal education seminars on
CRT generally, as well as the application of CRT to evidence law more
specifically, train attorneys to identify and object to racism.343 They
could also assist judges to decrease their own implicit biases and
become more impartial and fair in their evidentiary rulings.344
Education on techniques of critical race evidentiary analysis can help us
understand how racial stereotypes and biases are presented as or
assumed to be evidence at trial. Once an attorney can recognize racial
character evidence, he or she can object to it and encourage the court to
mitigate its effects.
B. Confronting Racial Character Evidence in Grand Juries
Before getting into evidentiary objections, rebuttal evidence, and
jury instructions that can be made to limit the use racial character
evidence at trial, we should pause to consider racial character evidence
in grand jury proceedings. As discussed above, reliance on racial
character evidence of victims of color as dangerous, threatening, and
criminally-inclined can lead to grand juries failing to indict the police
officers who killed them. Juror reliance on racial character evidence is
particularly difficult to address at the grand jury stage, however,
because the proceedings are conducted in secrecy345 with only minimal
court supervision.346 Further, the rules of evidence generally do not
apply to grand jury proceedings.347 Thus, there is no judge to prevent
342. Id. at 2260.
343. Id. at 2303.
344. Id.
345. 1 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 106 (4th ed. 2008); FED. R. CRIM. PROC.
6(e); Richard M. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, 459 (1965).
346. See 2 MOD. CONST. L. § 27:9 (3d ed. 2011).
347. See McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936, 938 (1978).
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the submission of racial character evidence or opportunity for
evidentiary objections to be made to such evidence, even when racial
bias against the victim might violate the victim’s equal protection
rights.
As we have seen in high-profile cases—such as those concerning
the deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice—some
prosecutors have used the grand jury process as a way to hold secret
one-sided trials in favor of police officer defendants.348 Hence, it is
critical that the problem of grand juror reliance on racial character
evidence is dealt with. One possible approach would be to institute
enhanced court supervision after the return of a no true bill. Courts
could encourage grand jurors to come forward if they observed racial
bias during the proceedings or deliberations. No-impeachment rules like
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and state equivalents generally do not
prevent jurors from testifying about racial bias in grand juror
proceedings after a failure to indict because the rule only applies to
impeachment of verdicts and indictments.349 Since there was no
indictment, there is no Rule 606(b) bar. If the failure to indict was
based upon racial bias, a second grand jury proceeding could be held.
The prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply to grand jury
proceedings.350
However, this safeguard is unsatisfying for several reasons. First,
it is unlikely that grand jurors would be able to detect all uses of racial
character evidence or be motivated to report anything but the most
blatant instances. Second, there is little reason to believe that a second
grand jury proceeding would yield different results. Prosecutors have
significant control over grand jury proceedings and can effectively
determine whether the defendant is charged.351 Due to the close
relationship between local law enforcement and local prosecutors,
district attorneys are often reluctant to prosecute police officers.352
Scholars, lawyers, and policy-makers have been critical of the use of

348. Ross, supra note 20, at 764.
349. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
350. U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49
(1992).
351. See Joshua Hegarty, Who Watches the Watchmen? How Prosecutors Fail
to Protect Citizens from Police Violence, 37 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL'Y &
PRAC. 305, 320–21 (2016).
352. Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (“[P]rosecutors often enjoy too close of a relationship
with local police and are therefore reluctant to turn against those with whom they have
worked.”).
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grand juries in police misconduct and killing cases and have advocated
for alternatives.353 Examples of these reforms include: use of special or
independent prosecutors;354 federal prosecution either under federal law
provisions or assignment of federal prosecutors to state-level
prosecutions;355 direct citizen access to grand juries;356 appointment of a
victim advocate in grand jury proceedings;357 judicial oversight of the
grand jury;358 and additional procedural mechanisms to supplement the
grand jury.359
The problem of racial character evidence provides another basis
for questioning current grand jury procedures in cases of police
killings. In evaluating the advisability of reforms, the dangers posed by
grand juror reliance on racial character evidence should be considered.
There needs to be an opportunity to root out and address the use of
racial character evidence against victims of color to prevent violations
of their equal protection rights at the grand jury stage.
C. Evidentiary Objections to Racial Character Evidence
There are several evidentiary objections which should be
considered when an opposing party introduces racial character evidence
at trial. These objections include improper character evidence, lack of
relevance, unfair prejudice, inadmissible expert opinion testimony, and
impermissible lay opinion. As most state evidence rules are modeled
after the Federal Rules of Evidence,360 these objections are discussed in
the context of the federal rules.
1. IMPROPER CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) sets forth a general character
propensity ban that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character
353. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and Bad Ways to Address Police Violence,
48 URB. L. 675, 681–82 (2016).
354. Id. at 681 (citing FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING 21 (2015)).
355. Id. at 681–82; Fairfax, Jr., supra note 339, at 416–17.
356. See Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police
Brutality in America: Direct and Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as a Remedy for
Victims of Police Brutality When the Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L. REV.
271, 298 (1994).
357. Witmer-Rich, supra note 27.
358. Fairfax, Jr., supra note 339, at 412.
359. Id.
360. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 2–3 (3d ed. 2013).
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trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character or trait.”361 Further, Rule 404(b)
provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.”362 These rules mean that evidence of a defendant’s or
victim’s character or prior bad acts cannot be used to prove that he or
she committed a crime or acted a certain way during the incident in
question. Just as a defendant’s or victim’s character or past acts cannot
be used to prove that he or she was violent during the event in question,
it is impermissible for race to be used as a proxy for character traits.
Similarly, race should not be used as a proxy to determine whether a
witness is honest or dishonest, credible or unbelievable on the stand.
It is a well-settled principle in evidence law that character cannot
be an issue in a criminal case “unless the defendant chooses to make it
one.”363 Defendants make character an issue at trial by utilizing
exceptions to Rule 404 which allow them to introduce evidence of their
good character364 or a victim’s bad character, as long as the evidence is
of a trait pertinent to the case.365 Defendants and their counsel are often
hesitant to introduce character evidence about the defendant’s character
because once he or she opens the door, the prosecutor can respond with
evidence to rebut it.366 If a defendant offers evidence of a victim’s
pertinent character trait, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it
and evidence of defendant’s same trait.367 For instance, if a defendant
calls a character witness to testify that the victim had a reputation for
being violent, the prosecutor could then call a character witness to
testify that the victim had a peaceful character and that the defendant
had a character for violence.
The risks associated with introducing character evidence give a
perverse incentive for defendants to introduce racial character evidence.
Defendants may try to circumvent the character evidence rules and
risks by introducing racial character evidence. For instance, a
defendant police officer who has a history of violence in his
361. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
362. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
363. People v. Zachowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, J.)
(“Fundamental hitherto has been the rule that character is never an issue in a criminal
prosecution unless the defendant chooses to make it one.”).
364. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A).
365. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(B).
366. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A).
367. Id.
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professional or personal life might be hesitant to call character
witnesses to testify about his own character for nonviolence or the
victim’s violent character since the prosecutor might rebut with a
character witness attesting to the defendant’s violent reputation. If the
victim is a person of color, however, the defendant could circumvent
these rules by introducing evidence or asserting arguments that
emphasize racial stereotypes about the victim, which provoke factfinders to make inferences about the victim’s violent character and
violent action during the event. Further, even if a defendant is not
afraid to open the door to character evidence, they might resort to
racial character evidence because the victim was truly a peaceful
person, and the defendant cannot secure a character witness to testify
otherwise.
Since most attorneys lack awareness of racial character evidence
and its impact, opposing counsel typically fails to sufficiently object to
racial character evidence. Further, since most judges are unfamiliar
with the concept of race as character evidence, even when appropriate
objections are made, the judge might be unpersuaded. It is imperative
that attorneys and judges become educated on the role that racial
character evidence plays in criminal prosecutions, especially police
killing cases.
2. LACK OF RELEVANCE
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and state equivalents, the
evidence is relevant only if “it has any tendency to make a fact [of
consequence] more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.”368 Evidence that is not relevant is never admissible.369
Evidence of a fact is relevant only “if the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.”370 Whether a fact is of consequence depends on
the substantive law governing the charge, defense, or other material
issue in the case.371 Thus, in analyzing the relevance of racial character
evidence in police killing cases, we must look to the applicable
substantive law.

368.
369.
370.
371.

FED. R. EVID. 401.
FED. R. EVID. 402. (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”).
FED. R. EVID. 401(b).
FISHER, supra note 360, at 23.
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The central issue in police deadly force cases is usually whether
the officer’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable.372 It is
implausible that (purported) evidence of a victim’s racial propensity to
be threatening, aggressive, or violent—or evidence that emphasizes
racial stereotypes to show such a propensity—could ever be a fact of
consequence. The fact that a victim of color was a racial minority does
not have any tendency to show that he or she was violent, aggressive,
or threatening, or that the officer reasonably felt threatened by the
victim. Even conservative Supreme Court justices, who are disinclined
to recognize many manifestations of racism as unlawful, find the notion
that race could be a factor in predicting propensity for violence
abhorrent.373 Thus, it is likely a court, upon proper objection, would
find direct racial character evidence, such as the likes of the expert
testimony of Dr. Quijano, irrelevant. Moreover, the argument or
inference that an officer was afraid of a person simply because he or
she was a person of color and accordingly resorted to deadly force is
redolent of blatant racism, not to mention unreasonable.
Further, racial character evidence that emphasizes stereotypes to
imply a victim’s racial propensity for being violent, aggressive, or
otherwise threatening would likely not be relevant either. For instance,
if the portions of Officer Darren Wilson’s grand jury testimony
characterizing Michael Brown as a black brute or thug had occurred at
trial, it should have been objected to and deemed inadmissible on the
basis of relevance (as well as unfair prejudice, a discussion of which
follows). Wilson’s subjective testimony equating himself to a “fiveyear-old” in comparison to the strength of Brown who was like “Hulk
Hogan”374 and a “grunting”375 “demon”376 was not relevant since the
governing standard is not whether the officer was subjectively afraid of
the victim, but whether the officer was reasonably afraid and whether
the use of deadly force was reasonable.377 The governing standard is
one of objective reasonableness, not subjective fear. Accordingly, while
perceiving a victim to be of hulkish strength and looking demonic might
support a subjective fear, it is not relevant to the reasonableness
372. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
373. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017); Buck v. Thaler, 565 U.S.
1022, 1022 (2011) (denying certiorari while noting that the trial testimony was “bizarre
and objectionable”).
374. Transcript of Grand Jury Volume V, supra note 270, at 212.
375. Id. at 227.
376. Id. at 225.
377. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7–8; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.
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inquiry. Prosecutors should be prepared and equipped to object to such
subjective, race-laden testimony on relevance grounds.
3. RISK OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE
Even if a piece of racial character evidence that emphasizes
negative racial stereotypes is found to be relevant under the low
threshold of Rule 401, the evidence is likely of low probative value.
Accordingly, this probative value can be substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and
equivalent state rules378 provide that “[t]he court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of . . . unfair prejudice[.]”379 As I have previously advocated,380 Rule
403 and its state counterparts’ use of the term “prejudice” includes
racial prejudice and seeking to provoke racial prejudice in the hearts
and minds of fact-finders.
When Officer Wilson described Michael Brown as superhuman in
strength, like a demon, grunting and charging, and physically
unaffected by multiple gunshot wounds, he was evoking a centuries-old
racist stereotype about black men as threatening, animalistic, herculean
brutes who are a threat to white lives. His black brute characterization
of the teenager was an effort to incite racial fear in the minds of the
predominately white381 grand jury. If such evidence was offered at trial,
the prosecution should object that any probative value of such testimony
is substantially outweighed by the danger of racial prejudice. These
characterizations sought to provoke the jury to rely on racial
stereotypes to determine that the black victim posed a threat to the
defendant and that shooting twelve rounds at an unarmed teenager, who
had actually tried to flee, was reasonable. It should be recognized that
378. Most state courts have rules similar to Federal Rule 403. See CLIFFORD S.
FISHMAN, 2 JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 11:10–11 (7th ed. Supp. 2016). Some states have a
less stringent version of Rule 403 which more readily precludes prejudicial evidence.
See, e.g., PA. R. EVID. 403 (which differs from the federal rule as prejudice need only
outweigh probative value and not “substantially” outweigh probative value as required
by the federal rule).
379. FED. R. EVID. 403.
380. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2304–05.
381. Darren Wilson’s grand jury consisted of six white men, three white
women, two black women, and one black man. See Associated Press, Racial and
Gender Makeup of Grand Jury Revealed in Ferguson Case, CBS NEWS (Aug. 22, 2014,
4:35
PM),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180402032300/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fergus
on-case-racial-and-gender-makeup-of-grand-jury-revealed/].

GONZALES ROSE – CAMERA READY (DO NOT DELETE)

430

5/2/2018 11:15 AM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Rule 403 and its state equivalents preclude such racial prejudice and
efforts of a party to incite racial prejudice.
4. INADMISSIBLE EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the testimony of expert
witnesses. It provides that a witness “who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the
form of an opinion or otherwise if:”382
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.383
An example of expert witness testimony on racial character
evidence can be found in Saldano v. Texas384 and Buck v. Davis,385
where psychologist Dr. Walter Quijano testified that blacks and
Hispanics had a greater propensity for violence than other races.386 In
these cases, defense counsel failed to properly object to the testimony
or expert reports which contained similar statements.387 In Buck, Dr.
Quijano actually served as a witness for the defense.388
Dr. Quijano’s conclusion that blacks and Hispanics are prone to
violence was built on racist supposition and unreliable methodology. In
fact, Justice Alito described Dr. Quijano’s testimony as “bizarre and
objectionable.”389 Dr. Quijano based his conclusion on the fact that
blacks and Hispanics are disproportionately incarcerated in comparison
to the general population.390 While it is true that blacks and Latinos are
382. FED. R. EVID. 702.
383. Id.
384. 530 U.S. 1212 (2000).
385. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
386. See id. at 768; Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 884–85 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002).
387. See, e.g., Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 884–85 (where Dr. Quijano testified that
the defendant’s Hispanic heritage weighed in favor of a finding of future
dangerousness).
388. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 768–69.
389. See Buck v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 1022, 1022 (2011).
390. Chebium, supra note 299.
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overrepresented in prisons,391 this is the result of racial profiling,
racially disproportionate stops and frisks,392 less favorable plea
bargains,393 as well as disproportionate convictions and sentencing394—
not increased criminality.395 Such racial character evidence should be
objected to on Rule 702(b) grounds because it is not a product of
reliable principles and methods.
5. INADMISSIBLE LAY OPINION TESTIMONY
Federal Rule of Evidence 701 allows lay opinions, providing in
relevant part that:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the
form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally
based on the witness’s perception; [and] (b) helpful to clearly
understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact
in issue[.]396
Testimony that a racialized group has a particular character trait is not
rationally based on the witness’s perception. Racism is never

391. According to 2010 statistics, 62% of the national prison population is
black and 27% are Latino, while whites make up only 10.7%. See Prison Policy
Initiative, United States Incarceration Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 2010 (2010),
[https://perma.cc/29SE-7X7Q].
392. See Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American Males:
Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
439, 456 (2004); Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. C.L. UNION, [https://perma.cc/M7UMHE8N]; Vikram Dodd, Police Up to 28 Times More Likely to Stop and Search Black
People—Study, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2012, 7:37 PM EDT), [https://perma.cc/3ETJ43PB] (reporting that police are “up to 28 times more likely to use stop-and-search
powers” against blacks than whites).
393. Once arrested, whites are more likely to receive offers of favorable plea
bargains. See Carodine, supra note 102, at 561–62.
394. Federal sentences imposed on black males are almost 20% longer than
those imposed on whites for similar offenses. ACLU, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
SENTENCING 1 (2014), [https://perma.cc/92AU-RL36]. Further, blacks account for
over 40% of current death row inmates despite only making up 13.3% of the U.S.
population. AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DEATH BY DISCRIMINATION 1
(2003), [https://perma.cc/PX8Q-PLQY]; Quick Facts: United States, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, [https://perma.cc/84DG-A2HQ].
395. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 131 (2010) (discussing the disproportionate number of arrests
and conviction of blacks and Latinos even though whites committed equal levels of drug
offenses).
396. FED. R. EVID. 701.
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reasonable, and racial generalizations are never sound. It is not
reasonable or rational to attribute certain moral and behavioral
characteristics to a group of people simply because of the color of their
skin or racial classification. Further, a witness’s opinion that members
of a racial group are either peaceful or violent (or any other character
trait that might be pertinent in a police killing prosecution) is a baseless
opinion that cannot be helpful when determining a fact in issue or
otherwise understanding the witness’s testimony.
D. Rebuttal Evidence of Victims’ Good Character
Not all forms of racial character evidence can be objected to
directly under the rules of evidence. There are several reasons for this.
First, some racial character evidence occurs behind closed jury room
doors and may not be easily detected or discovered. Second, some
racial character evidence might not explicitly violate the text of the
evidence rules; however, it may still contravene the important
principles and values behind the rules. This is cause for concern
because the aims of our evidence laws are not being fulfilled. Further,
as discussed above, reliance on this racial character evidence against
victims of color to support an acquittal may actually infringe on the
victim’s equal protection rights.397 To remediate these contraventions of
evidence law objectives and equal protection rights, this sub-Part
advocates for more liberal admission of evidence that supports police
killing victims’ good character.
Due to the invidious nature of racism generally, and race as
character evidence specifically, racial character evidence is rarely
formally introduced. Thus, while it plays an outcome determinative role
at trial, it often cannot be directly objected to at trial. This is
particularly true for the inherent reliance type of racial character
evidence, as well as when jurors play pseudo lay or expert opinion
witnesses. In these circumstances, while evidence rules themselves have
not been overtly violated, the principles, rationales, and values behind
the rules have been violated.
Two examples of when racial character evidence violates the
principles behind the evidence rules rather than the enumerated rules
themselves are when a juror offers expert or lay opinion racial
character testimony during deliberations and when race serves to
bolster the credibility of witnesses. To illustrate the former, we can
look at the Peña-Rodriguez case. Juror H.C. acted as a lay opinion
397.

See supra Part III.
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witness, providing “evidence” from his personal experience that
Mexican men have a character propensity to act with aggression,
bravado, and entitlement against females.398 Additionally, in reliance on
his professional experience as a former law enforcement officer, he
acted as an expert witness for his opinion that ninety percent of the
time, Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive towards females.399
While jurors are supposed to use and reflect upon the common sense
judgment of the community, here Juror H.C. acted as a witness in the
case and effectively testified about Mexicans’ or Mexican Americans’
propensity to commit violence against women as proof of the
defendant’s guilt.
For the reasons provided above, such expert and lay opinion
testimony on a victim’s racial character violates Federal Rules of
Evidence 701 and 702, respectively.400 It also violates Federal Rules of
Evidence 401 and 403 for not being relevant and for being unfairly
prejudicial,401 both because it relies on racial prejudice and, as noted
below, it risks overreliance by fellow jurors. Further, Rule 606(a)
provides that “[a] juror may not testify as a witness before the other
jurors at the trial.”402 Since this expert and lay opinion racial character
evidence was conveyed in the jury room and not the courtroom, it does
not directly violate the rule. However, it violates the principles, values,
and concerns behind the rule. A sitting juror is disqualified as a witness
under Rule 606(a) for two reasons.
First, testifying would cast a juror in a conflicted role, for the
juror would be asked in the end to weigh his or her own evidence
against the evidence of other witnesses. Second, testimony by a sitting
juror would inject serious risks of “unfair prejudice” within the
meaning of Rule 403: The jury as a whole is likely to misuse such
evidence, according it more or less than its due because of its close
source.403
In the Peña-Rodriguez case, Juror H.C. was placed (or more
accurately, placed himself) in this conflicted role. He seemed to have
decided that the evidence in the case was outweighed by his own
“evidence.” Furthermore, Juror H.C. not only relied upon this racially
biased character evidence in determining his vote on the defendant’s
398. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017).
399. Id.
400. See supra Part IV.C.4, 5.
401. See supra Part IV.C.2, 3.
402. FED. R. EVID. 606(a).
403. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 6:15 (4th ed. 2013).
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guilt, but he also tried to persuade other jurors with his purported
expertise on and observations of people of Mexican descent or origin to
convict the defendant.404 There was a serious risk of unfair prejudice
within the meaning of Rule 403 since fellow jurors were likely to rely
more heavily on this evidence coming from such a familiar source and
accordingly misuse it. While a juror’s own submission of racial
character evidence might not have violated the letter of Rule 606(a), it
certainly violates its spirit and the rationale behind the rule.
A second example is witness credibility. Racial character evidence
is not always about a negative character trait; it can also be used to
assert positive character traits. Due to implicit racial bias, whites who
testify at trial are generally perceived to be more credible than people
of color.405 Jurors often:
[C]onsider a witness’s whiteness as de facto evidence of the
witness’s character for truthfulness. . . . [W]ithout formally
entering evidence or investing resources, the party calling the
white witness has been able to bolster their witness’s
credibility for truthfulness. Conversely, a witness of color is
automatically considered less credible, and to bolster the
witness of color’s character of truthfulness the party must
navigate rigorous evidence rules.406
Federal Rule of Evidence 608 provides that evidence of a witness’s
truthful character is admissible only after that witness’s character for
truthfulness has been attacked.407 The benefits of racial character
evidence for racially-privileged persons, particularly police officer
defendants, are twofold. Firstly, white (or non-black) witnesses have
bolstered credibility at the onset of their testimony, while witnesses of
color are unable to bolster their credibility unless and until their
character is formally attacked. Secondly, since racial character evidence
falls below most attorneys’ and judges’ radar, it can be relied upon to
circumvent Rule 608. The proponent of racial character evidence may
stealthily attack a witness of color’s character—through reliance on
blackness or brownness as a proxy for dishonesty, lack of credibility,
404. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 870 (2017).
405. See generally Amanda Carlin, The Courtroom as White Space: Racial
Performance as Noncredibility, 63 UCLA L. REV. 450, 471, 477–84 (2016); Sheri
Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 261 (1996).
406. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2259.
407. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
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or otherwise bad character—without objection or recognition by the
court that the witness’s character has been attacked. Thus, there will be
no opportunity for rehabilitation of the witness. In other words, since it
is not acknowledged that the witness of color’s character for
truthfulness was attacked, a character witness cannot be called to
bolster his or her credibility. Further, even if a witness of color’s
character is formally attacked, he or she can only have his or her
character bolstered by an investment of time and resources to secure
and introduce a character witness.
Both of these examples show how race can serve as character
evidence allowing racism to permeate the jury box in violation of
evidence law principles with limited, if any, opportunity for objection.
These are examples of how the evidentiary playing field is not level in
terms of race. This is particularly concerning in the prosecution of
white or non-black police officers for killing people of color, where it
is likely witnesses for the prosecution will be racial minorities. In many
instances, racial bias played a role in the victim of color being killed by
police on the street. Racial bias then plays a role at trial in ensuring that
the officer is not held accountable for the killing.
In a criminal justice system where white or otherwise raciallyprivileged defendant police officers receive evidentiary benefit and
where victims of color are collectively subordinated under the
application or inapplicability of evidentiary rules on the basis of race,
solutions should be crafted to create a more even evidentiary playing
field. This is particularly necessary when racial bias might deprive a
victim of the guarantees of equal protection.
One solution would be for judges, in their discretion, to more
liberally permit victim character evidence on positive traits in order to
counter the racialized dehumanization of a victim of color at trial when
it appears there is a risk that the jurors will rely upon racial character
evidence in rendering a verdict. The victim’s character evidence should
not be limited to the form of opinion or reputation testimony. Rather,
judges should permit the prosecution leniency to present a more wellrounded representation of the victim’s character when the defense
paints a one-dimensional caricature of the victim based on racial
stereotypes. Judges should also permit the prosecution to demonstrate
the victim’s character for peacefulness not only when the victim is
labelled aggressive or violent outright, but also when the victim’s
character has been impeached insidiously and implicitly through the use
of racial character evidence. A similar remedy could also be
implemented when a witness’s character for truthfulness is impeached
through racial character evidence.
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One concern about allowing the introduction of evidence of a
witness’s good character is that the jury might become too sympathetic
about the death of the victim and convict the defendant even if the
prosecution has not proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt. This
is a legitimate concern in most criminal cases. Often the proverbial
deck is stacked against a criminal defendant, despite the formal
presumption of “innocent until proven guilty”; however, in the case of
police officers who kill people, particularly people of color, the deck is
stacked in favor of the officer. As set forth at the beginning of the
Article,408 there is a reluctance at every stage of criminal proceedings to
hold law enforcement officers accountable for killing black and brown
persons—from prosecutors’ unwillingness to investigate and pursue
charges, grand juries’ failure to indict, juries’ hesitance to convict, and
judges’ light sentencing. Judges need to be aware of the reality and role
of racial character evidence in the courtroom and make admissibility
decisions that enhance racial equality at trial.
E. Jury Instructions
At the beginning of trial, jurors should be given instructions about
what racial character evidence is, the fact that it is impermissible, and
why. Many jurisdictions already have model jury instructions directing
jurors to determine facts without prejudice or bias.409 For instance,
Colorado’s Model Criminal Jury Instructions direct that jurors “must
not be influenced by sympathy, bias or prejudice in reaching [their]
decision.”410 Some states specifically instruct jurors to not rely upon
racial, ethnic, or gender bias in considering the evidence.411 Several
judges and jurisdictions go further and provide instructions on implicit
bias.412
Most famously, U.S. District Court Judge Mark W. Bennett413
gives the following instruction before opening statements in all criminal
and civil trials over which he presides:
408. See supra Part I.
409. Lee, supra note 264, at 1597–98; see also Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the
Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 859–60
(2012).
410. MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., COLORADO JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 2016, at E:01, 187 (2016), [https://perma.cc/M5G5-4WLG].
411. Lee, supra note 264, at 1598.
412. Id. at 1598–99.
413. Mark W. Bennett is a District Judge for U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of
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As we discussed in jury selection, growing scientific research
indicates each one of us has “implicit biases,” or hidden
feelings, perceptions, fears and stereotypes in our
subconscious. These hidden thoughts often impact how we
remember what we see and hear and how we make important
decisions. While it is difficult to control one’s subconscious
thoughts, being aware of these hidden biases can help
counteract them. As a result, I ask you to recognize that all of
us may be affected by implicit biases in the decisions that we
make. Because you are making very important decisions in
this case, I strongly encourage you to critically evaluate the
evidence and resist any urge to reach a verdict influenced by
stereotypes, generalizations, or implicit biases.414
Jury instructions on racial character evidence would not only serve
to educate jurors on this important issue, but it would also help them to
understand implicit bias. Asking jurors to recognize hidden biases and
not allow these biases to affect their decision-making is abstract and
difficult to employ. Providing an explanation of racial character
evidence could supply a tangible example of how racial bias is
improperly relied upon as “proof” in a way that can unknowingly
influence decisions. Thus, instructions containing examples of racial
character evidence would be a concrete way to explain the existence
and manifestation of implicit racial bias. It is easy for judges to ask
jurors to try to be impartial when deliberating and rendering a verdict,
but the glaring statistics on juries’ failure to convict police officers415
demonstrate that such vague instructions likely go unheard. It is time to
employ more tangible, concrete means to get the jury to better
understand the full effect of racial character evidence and implicit bias
in the courtroom.
Jurors should be instructed to consider only the evidence formally
presented in the case at hand. Our laws require that people be judged
on the basis of their actions during the event in question, and not based
on the type of person they are and certainly never on their race. Race is
not a relevant factor to consider in determining whether a victim,
witness, or defendant is good or bad, peaceful or violent, honest or
dishonest, or any other character trait. Implicit bias can work both in
Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed
Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 149
(2010).
414. Id. at 169 n.85.
415. See supra Part I.D.
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favor of and against individuals on the basis of their skin color and
racial classification, but no one should be given special or disfavored
treatment because of their race—certainly never in the courtroom.
Taking Judge Bennett’s lead, and consistent with recommendations by
scholars,416 potential jurors could also be educated about implicit bias
and racial character evidence during juror orientation. This would serve
to teach everyone summoned for jury service, irrespective of whether
they ultimately are selected to serve on a jury, how to become more
aware of and reduce their implicit racial biases.
CONCLUSION
Racialized police killings are as old as policing itself and promise
to continue. Modern law enforcement originated with the slave
patrols,417 and, as recently as July 2017, President Donald Trump
openly encouraged racialized police violence, voicing support for more
brutal treatment of “thugs” by arresting officers to thunderous applause
from an audience of law enforcement officers.418 It appears the current
administration is not committed to lessening or even responding to the
national crisis of police violence against people of color. In April 2018,
when asked about the police killing of Stephon Clark—an unarmed
black man shot eight times, primarily in the back, in his grandmother’s
backyard in Sacramento, California419—the Trump Administration’s
Press Secretary answered that his death was merely a “local matter.”420
The lack of executive leadership on this urgent civil rights issue makes
416. Roberts, supra note 409, at 860–66.
417. See, e.g., NORM STAMPER, TO PROTECT AND SERVE: HOW TO FIX
AMERICA’S POLICE 22 (2016); Ex-Seattle Police Chief Condemns Systemic Police
Racism Dating Back to Slave Patrols, DEMOCRACY NOW! (July 14, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/YB5X-R6ZA].
418. Maggie Haberman & Liz Robbins, Trump, on Long Island, Vows an End
to
Gang
Violence,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
28,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/us/politics/trump-immigration-gang-violencelong-island.html.
419. Jelani Cobb, Stephon Clark and the Shooting of Black Men, Armed and
Unarmed, NEW YORKER (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/stephon-clark-and-the-shooting-of-black-men-armed-and-unarmed;
Frances
Robles & Jose A. Del Real, Stephon Clark Was Shot 8 Times Primarily in His Back,
Family-Ordered
Autopsy
Finds,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
30,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/us/stephon-clark-independent-autopsy.html.
420. Katie Reilly, Trump White House Calls Fatal Police Shooting of Stephon
Clark a “Local Matter,” TIME (Mar. 28, 2018, 8:00 PM ET),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180415204825/http://time.com/5219574/donald-trumpstephon-clark-local-matter/].
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it all the more imperative that we understand and address the role that
racial character evidence plays in the unwarranted police killings of
black and brown people on the street, and, of equal importance, the
function it serves in exonerating police officers at trial, or in making
sure these cases never even get there in the first place. Race is
impermissibly used as evidence in the courtroom every day, and
evidence law needs to be employed to preclude it from further harming
victims of color, their communities, and the actual and perceived
legitimacy of our criminal justice system.

